What's New in Neurofeedback
A Monthly Summary of News and Events

Vol. 8 No. 2 - February 2005

This newsletter is sponsored by EEG Spectrum Intl, Inc.,
a leader in providing clinical service and training professionals.
Past issues available at http://start.eegspectrum.com/Newsletter/
To subscribe or cancel, see newsletter's end. Opinions related in
this newsletter reflect the author's only. Copyright (C) 2005
by EEG Spectrum Intl, Inc. or David Kaiser. All rights reserved.
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Announcements - News
In the Spotlight - Questions about Language, Public and Private
News & Reviews - Books & journal papers
Events & Locations - Conferences, Courses
Last Word - none

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Neural disease researcher melds optics and computer software
College May Buff Up Aging Brains
Some 'Senior Moments' Are Signs of Epilepsy
Rainbow Coalition of the Brain
Brain Stimulation May Curb Persistent Depression
Big Brains Not Always Better
Bird Brains Get Some New Names, And New Respect
Brain Immaturity Could Explain Teen Crash Rate
Brain theory of eating disorders
Meditation Gives Brain a Charge, Study Finds


All links at:
http://news.yahoo.com/fc?tmpl=fc&cid=34&in=science&cat=brain_research

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In the Spotlight

Questions about Language, Public and Private

Two symbolic systems: public and private

There is no social behavior without communication (Evans & Bastian,
1969). Few species exist which do not possess a substantial
repertoire of symbolic communicative devices such as vocalizations,
displays, postures, and/or gestures. Also, many species exhibit
behaviors that express an symbolic processing of external reality
(Roitblat, Bever, & Terrace, 1984). But these two symbolic systems
remain separate with little conceptual or featural overlap in nearly
all species but one, humans. In overlapping our two symbol systems,
we have become the paragon of animals, to quote one of us.

This integration is not complete. Many elements of communication
such as phonemes or words, are used extensively in representational
roles while others are hardly used at all, such as gestures or
postures. Some aspects of our representations are cannot readily be
communicated (e.g., the tip-of-the-tongue experience). To what
degree are these two symbol systems integrated in humans? Do other
mammals also use symbols which possess (public)communicational as
well as private (representational) elements, and to what degree?
What is the nature of communicative and representational
integration? Which neural systems are responsible for this
integration in humans? In other mammals? Does this integration alter
either system?

Language instruction in animals (e.g., ape language research)
provides a structured environment in which variables can be isolated
and explored, which is not so easy to do with humans. Premack (1985)
found evidence for integration of communicative and representational
systems in the behavior of a common chimpanzee. According to Premack
(1985) words have two functions in human language: (1) the external
function of words is to retrieve or communicate information; and (2)
the word serves as an intrinsic part of mental representation. He
tested (1) the communicative function of lexigrams (plastic word) by
determine how effective each lexigram was evoking a mental
representation in a chimpanzee (troglodyte). He found that the most
salient physical feature of a fruit for a chimpanzee was color:
specific colors were effective in retrieving the animal's mental
representation of the object. However, names were even more
effective (e.g., fewest errors in tests). Consequently, lexigrams
(plastic words) proved to be extremely effective communicative
devices. To test (2) the representational function of a word, he
applied a phenomena observed in the performance of matching to
sample testing in apes. A blue triangle (lexigram), which refers to
a red apple, can be matched to a red patch of color correctly; but a
blue-painted apple cannot be matched to a red patch. Somehow a
blue-painted word evokes a red apple whereas a blue-painted apple
does not evoke a red apple. Either the blue apple is not recognized
as an apple (which is very unlikely), or perception of a blue apple
interferes with the representation of a red one. He found that
perception of a distorted example of an object adversely influences
the representation of a normal example of this object . Premack
(1985) terms this the impairment effect. The adverse effect occurs
within the same form of representation only (an object must be
compared to another object). Evidence for an impairment effect of
words would indicate that physical features of a word are being
represented by a chimpanzee. It turns out that perception of a
distorted word (orange triangle) does interfere with representation
of a normal word (blue triangle). Chimpanzees find it difficult to
match a distorted lexigram for apple (orange triangle) with a blue
patch (normal color of word for apple). In contrast, chimpanzees
could match blue-painted apples with a red patch of color . The
impairment effect arises when perception and representation of the
same form of information (lexigram and lexigram, or object and
object) are incompatible. The impairment effect does not occur when
perception and representation of different forms of information
(lexigram and object) are incompatible. There is no impairment
effect between word and referent; only when referent and referent or
word and word are incompatible in same way does the effect arise.
The impairment effect is offers a powerful tool, albeit complicated,
for comparing mental representations of different species, and
different levels of development within these species. Premack (1985)
concluded that, like human words, plastic lexigrams possessed both
representational and communicative functions. In spite of this
demonstration of mental continuity, the degree of integration of
representational and communicative systems may still quantitatively
separate human and nonhuman experiences.

How is human language different than other communication systems?
Humans have developed many communication systems that have little to
do with language (e.g., stop lights). A definition of language would
be useful here; but herein lies some of the difficulty of studying
this problem: there is no explanatory nor conceptual definition
which is widely agreed upon. Chomsky (1980), for example, states
that the most elementary property of human language is that it
involves a "denumerable infinity of functionally distinct
expressions", which also describes the system of mathematics. And
the productivity of human language is not infinite, but specific to
those discernable elements in the social and physical problem-space
of human experience (e.g., Parker, 1985). One fact is certain:
language is a behavior that has certain consequences, and these
consequences are in terms of representation and communication. An
utterance has both an ideational meaning and interpersonal meaning
or social purpose (Parker, 1985). Language conveys propositional and
referential information and it provides alternative ways of
expressing ideas as well as means for the speaker to communicate
effectively, engagingly, appropriately (Parker, 1985). The system of
language consists of hierarchically organized levels of processing
(i.e., phonology, morphology, semantics, syntax, pragmatics) and
consists of a number of design features (Hockett, 1960). Vauclair
(1990) provides a useful conceptual definition of language: Language
is a system that is both communicational and representational,
grounded in a social convention that attributes to certain
substitutes (signifiers) the power to designate other substitutes
(referents). But was the process of integrating representational and
communicational symbol systems abrupt or gradual?

When did language evolve?

There are nearly as many questions about language evolution as there
are theories, which probably number only slightly fewer than
languages in the world. When did language evolve? Why did language
evolve? How did language evolve? What effects did it have on
behavior and cognition? When and how did primate vocalizations come
to be supplemented, transformed, or replaced by the system of human
language may be answerable. The transformation from ape to hominid
entailed some hundred morphological, physiological, and behavioral
evolutionary changes (Wind, 1981). However, the changes may not been
radical alterations. For instance, according to Wind (1981) the
morphology of the apes' vocal apparatus cannot account for their
inability to speak. He argues that the primate pharynx and airway
were preadapted for speech-like vocalizations ever since the origins
of the anthropoids. "(I)f a chimpanzee larynx could be grafted into
an otherwise normal human being and if all the nerves could be
connected such a human individual would be able to produce
vocalizations and speech hardly or not discernible from the normal
ones." The development of the association and motor areas of the
brain was decisive for the origin of language as we know it. Falk
(1980) also questions the supposed late appearance of a modern
articulatory apparatus, saying that fossil reconstructions have been
insufficient to determine if qualitative alterations have occurred.
Wind (1982) believes that if the anthropoid vocal tracts were
properly wired neurologically, apes would be capable of producing a
sufficient variety of sounds to demonstrate at least some
rudimentary speech. Fossils of Australopithecus robustus display an
upper respiratory system closely akin to that of modern nonhuman
primates, particularly apes. Subsequently, Laitman (1981) concludes
that this species possessed a limited range of vocalizations.
Fossils of Homo erectus, however, show a descent of the larynx,
which would enable (with the pharynx) a greater range of
vocalizations than possible to Australopithecines. An upper
respiratory system similar to that of modern man, with a vocal
apparatus enabling human speech, is found as early as 300,000 years
ago in archaic Homo sapiens. Lieberman (1985) reports that major
changes to the upper respiratory systems have taken place in the
last 250,000 years; that even Neanderthal hominids retained most of
features of the nonhuman supralaryngeal airway and would not have
been able to encode speech as rapidly as even archaic Homo sapiens.

Language is more than rapid vocal behavior. Tobias (1987) reports
that Homo habilis possessed a prominent Broca's area in the
posterior part of the left inferior convolution, which exceeds the
prominence found in homologous areas in Australopithecus africanus .
The pattern of sulci in this region of the brain of Homo habilis is
comparable with that of modern humans and much different from apes.
The area around the parioeto-occipto-temporal junction (i.e.,
Wernicke's area) shows especially strong development in all
endocasts of H. habilis skulls. But he find no evidence of
laterality (i.e., pronounced development more pronounced on one side
than the other). However asymmetry of the Sylvian fissure is
indicated by impressions in the endocranical walls of Homo sapiens
neanderthalsis, Homo erectus, and even Australopithecus africanus
(LeMay & Geschwind, 1975). However, the first true speech sounds may
not have been uttered until very recently. Among the many
neuroanatomical changes which occur during the hominidization
process, there has been a progressive complication of the vascular
system, particularly surrounding the sylvian region of the brain. As
recently as 30,000 years ago, endocranial wall impressions of Cro
Magnon humans were complicated, indicating better vascularization of
the sylvian region than those humans who preceded them; but these
impressions suggest that the vascular system was not developed
enough to support speech. It was not until neolithic times
(10-12,000 years ago) that first fossils which possess a "squaring
of the parietal meningeal vascular system" are found, which
indicates that humans now possessed the developed vascularization
necessary for speech (Saban, 1981). Jaynes (1976a) argues that the
evolution of speech cannot be detected by fossil remains (i.e., a
skill may by physiologically possible but latent). However, the
origins of spoken language, the acquisition of words, etc., may have
produced behavioral changes in those hominids which possessed
speech, and these cultural/behavioral changes may be reflected in
the artefacts left behind. According to Jaynes (1976a), speech
produced three changes which benefitted hominids: (1) spoken words
enable one to train attention on specific salient features of
objects and events (in contrast, feral children have more difficulty
training attention, possibly due to however other factors besides
lack of language; (2) verbal labelling also facilitates recalls (cf.
Herman, 1986, analogous ability in dolphins); and (3) language
allows one to code and compare attributes of objects verbally,
thereby freeing us from the momentary perceptual impact of one
attribute or another.

When did speech originate in hominid? First, the supposed radical
change from a primate communication system to language must have
occurred at a time where its benefits outweighed in disadvantages
(e.g., greater likelihood of choking). When was there great enough
ecological pressure to evoke such a change? Glaciation was likely
the strongest ecological force at act upon hominid evolution. Each
Ice age, lasting approximately 70,000 years, would have brought
about a change in the habits and livelihood of hominids living at
the time. There have been four major glacial periods since the
transformation of H. erectus through archaic H. sapiens to H.
sapiens sapiens: the coldest periods being approximately 600,000,
400,000, 150,000, and 35,000 years ago. Warm interglacial periods
are probably without sufficient ecological challenge to provide
language with any new survival value if it had developed during
these periods. As mentioned above, the brain structures which
mediate language - - Broca's area in frontal lobe, Wernicke's area
around the Sylvian fissure, and the supplementary motor cortex --
are not strongly developed until H. habilis. The artefacts left
behind from H. habilis and H. erectus were crude, suggesting little
change from those of Australopithecines. The complete development of
language was not likely. Although there was some progression in tool
manufacture during the first three glaciation, the change was very
gradual. Speech subsequently must have originated during the fourth
glaciation. This age was characterized by large swings of
temperature, beginning 70,000 years ago, achieving its coldest
period about 35,000 BC. Normal temperatures returned around 8000 BC.
An explosion of artefacts and new technologies coincides with the
middle of the last ice age, approximately 40 -35,000 BC (Jaynes,
1976a). The human brain had reached its present proportions
(including its present-day increase in frontal lobes) between
250,000 to 100,000 years ago. Applying these time constraints,
Jaynes (1976a) places the origin of speech at approximately 40,000
BC. Some recent findings in South Africa would probably push this
back to 80,000 BC.

Attempts to reconstruct the earliest languages (e.g., Indo-European
languages from 2000 BC) by linguists and anthropologists suggest
that these languages were as complex as modern languages. If there
has been little change in linguistic complexity in 4000 years, how
much change could there have been in 40,000. The stability of
language complexity suggests a prolonged phylogeny of language,
possibly stretching back million of years. The rapid change in
technology may not indicates a rapid change in cognition and
linguistic capacities. Perhaps what occurred at this time of great
cultural change was a cultural shift. Language may have already been
present before this period, but the means and value of acquiring
knowledge may have changed; knowledge itself gained a new value,
beyond its value for helping to achieve an immediate goal. For the
first time the distribution of labor may have included individuals
who were not primarily hunters or plant gatherers but whose sole
social function involved the transmission and storage of
information, such as shamans, wise man, etc. The cognitive
capabilities of humans probably have not change qualitatively since
the evolution of language; however investigating the change in tools
and artefacts (e.g., from stone tools to cities and nuclear power
plants) are the work of the same intelligence. The rise of
industrialization via mass automation marks a change in an
individual's relationship to the process of knowledge acquisition.
The individual contributes to his own knowledge as well as serve the
cultural knowledge base.

Why did language evolve?

Why did language evolve? What ecological or social pressures
resulted in the development of speech? Gibson (1981) places the
selection pressure within child-parent communication. The dietary
niche of hominids -- omnivorous, extractive foraging with tools --
resulted in offspring depending heavy on parental guidance for long
periods of time. Sophisticated recognition of requests for aid, for
instance, for a specific tool or food item, would have required
greater sensitivity between communicants. According to Jerison
(1988) early hominids invaded an environmental niche (social
predator) that was inappropriate for primates in critical ways. The
niche of a social predator required behavioral and morphological
adaptations which were not present at the time, nor likely to
develop. Living species in this niche (e.g., wolves) must navigate,
control, and defend an extensive territory and range. A scent
marking system is ideal for differentiating territories (e.g., urine
cues). Higher primates, with reduced olfactory system, would likely
have had to rely on their most developed system, that is, the
auditory-vocal system, to contribute to the same kind of cognitive
mapping of the external world. Maintenance of these cognitive maps
over time required active participation. This could be done by
"linguistically-labelling" landmarks (e.g., a river labelled by a
particular whistle; an old tree by a phoneme-like sound).
Construction of these sensory map overlapped with the primate
communication system (i.e., occurred in same modality). This may
account for "the peculiar feature of human language." In language
humans share a constructed reality; whereas animal communication
(apparently) consists of primarily direct commands about behaviors.
"Self-consciousness (arose) to distinguish the reality generated by
one's own information (sensory, linguistic, etc.) from the reality
generated by verbal information from another individual." (cf.
Jaynes, 1976b). Livingstone (1981) also argues a similar origin of
language. However, those mammals which do exhibit territorial
vocalizations possess small territories, where all regions of the
territory are within easy auditory proximity. Baboons and
chimpanzees, who usually occupy large home ranges not unlike hominid
hunters, possess no specialized territorial displays. Fischer (1981)
postulates a vocal onomatopoetic theory. Speech originated in the
"magical" imitation of other species' cries (food calls, mating
calls). Such strange, less human vocalization would have allowed
humans a closer approach to prey than ordinary cries. Unlike earlier
hypotheses, there is some present-day support for this theory. For
example, Amazon basin Indians imitate 35 different species, not to
mention the wide use of decoys in hunting.The ability to imitate a
wide variety of sounds of prey, and other environmental sounds as
well, would have been selected for, as well as the imitation of
postures, movements, and gestures (Fischer,1981). This theory is
intuitively appealing in that, in essence, it means that Nature, the
elements, taught human to speak. Many researchers (e.g., Falk, 1980)
posit that deitic and iconic gestures were originally used to
communicative references during hunts, etc., which were slowly
supplanted by vocal referents. This may explain the ubiquitous
supportive presence of gestures during speech. However, individual
communications may have evolved not to describe the physical world
as much as the social world (cf. Bateson, 1966; Humphreys, 1976).

How did language evolve?

How did language develop? Did it developed in parallel with
cognitive abilities? Is it true that "language is less a gift of the
gods than an exploitation of the primate potential" (Desmond, 1979)?
Gibson (1981) compares the acquisition of object manipulation with
the acquisition of language skills, In phylogeny and ontogeny both
of these abilities mature through differentiation of existing
behaviors into smaller component parts, whose parts are combined and
recombined into new and varied behavioral patterns (see above). This
occurs vocally, semantically, and syntactically. Gradually, through
babbling, infantile coos differentiate into phonemes, which are
combinable into a virtually infinite variety of words. Similarly,
the semantic meaning conveyed by a child's first utterances is not
clearly differentiated and parents must judge from the immediate
context of the utterance. For example, the utterance "milk" made by
a young child could indicate the simple recognition of milk, or the
desire for a drink of milk. As grammatical and semantic skills
developed, the child becomes capable of constructing sentences with
various distinct meanings. In terms of syntactical constructions,
the speech of children begins with single word utterances. Gradual
increases on the mean length of utterances occurs during the second
and third years, coinciding with the development of grammatical
competence (Brown, 1980). The first grammatical constructions are
those of simple position: e.g., agent-action-object. The ability to
differentiate agent and object on the basis of more complex
grammatical rules (as in "the girl is kissed by the boy" or "the
girl that the boy kissed") does not emerge until about five to six
years of age (Limber, 1980). Children at this age can construct
hierarchical embedded structures and are able to judge the meaning
of an utterance by the sum total of grammatical features, rather
than by a single feature or position alone.

A constructional theory of the origin of language postulates a close
correspondence between the communicative and tool-using abilities of
primates (Reynolds,1981). (This theory is particularly interesting
in light of the possible dissociation of these capacities in the two
Pan species). According to this type of theory, the precursor of
human linguistic structure may be found in anthropoid constructional
ability in which objects are arranged into new functional
configurations (such as a ladder). Constructional actions possess
the following properties of (1) intentionality, (2) high-speed
execution of both sequential and simultaneous constituents, (3) the
creation of a new entity from constituent parts, (4) recursiveness,
(5) generalization to new contexts, and (6) nesting of one operation
within another. Ape ladder building has been observed in captivity.
Elements of this skill which parallel the structure of human
language are: (1) extensive practice of voluntary motor movements;
(2) ladders can be built quickly; (3) new construction not reducible
to constituent behaviors (no single element of ladder permits the
ape to climb higher); (4) each pole in one ladder is often used in
functionally different ways or positions in constructing other
ladders (evidence of recursive application);(5) the ability is
generalized to new contexts, with different poles, different
locations; (6) behaviors are nested in that the output of one
support operation is used as the input to another; and there is no
implicitly correct order of actions in ladder construction, actions
are executed within a hierarchical tree structure. Individual apes
build each ladder, but it is use socially to the extent that others
often hold or steady the ladder as others are climbing it. Hence,
human language is the product of general evolutionary changes of
primate constructional ability (Reynolds, 1981).

Gibson (1981) rejects constructional accounts of linguistic
development which are closely tied to tool use. Gestures like tool
use and object manipulation both depend upon differentiation and
construction in visual and manual modes, but speech depends on vocal
and auditory modes. The difference between the abilities in the two
species of Pan may indicating some evolutionary divergence between
vocal skills and the capacity for object manipulation.
Neuropsychological evidence indicate that the highest constructional
levels of tool use and language use are both mediated by the
inferior parietal and anterior frontal association areas. For
instance, lesions in these areas can result in any of the following:
ideational apraxia (inability to use objects properly), ideomotor
apraxia (inability to imitate gestures), inability to name objects,
and inability to understand or construct complex grammatical
relationships. But she notes that while aphasics need not be
apraxic, in general apraxic patients are usually always aphasia
(Gibson, 1981). She concludes that the synchrony between maturation
of object manipulation and language skills, in light of
neuropsychological evidence, reflects two closely tied but separate
neurological processes.

This does not deny a possible fundamental parallel between language
and skilled movement sequences. Complex motor skills are
hierarchically organized: i.e., "the responses contained in a
movement sequence exist as sets of sequential dependencies that
effect the probability of subsequent responses" (Gibson,1981,
pp.20-21). Calvin (1988) suggests the sequential processing involved
in syntactical processing was first developed in complex motor
sequences, such as throwing objects to hit targets. The sequence of
muscle commands which are necessary for walking or breathing may be
viewed as a preadaptation for rule- governed syntactical processing
(Lieberman, 1981). Gregory (1970) suggests that the rule-governed
nature of human language is an extension of neural rules that order
retinal patterns into objects. The phylogeny of language involved a
"take-over operation" in which humans exploited the development of
the visual system in higher primates to structure vocal signalling:
representational and perceptual processes were integrated with
communicative processes.

Human language is a communication system that is also a cognitive
system . The first steps toward complete integration of
representational and communicative systems in the mammalian brain
probably began millions of years ago. Considering general
ecological, morphological, and perceptual constraints, cetaceans
seem best suited, among all mammals, to develop communal
constructions of reality. Strangely, there is little evidence of a
theory of mind in dolphins, positive or negative. Accounts of
altruistic acts by cetaceans are many, and even some behaviors which
border on pedagogy, but few if any empirical tests have been
designed to investigate this issue. There is anecdotal evidence of
dolphins behaving as if they are aware of the existence of other
minds. Do dolphins monitor the effects of signals that they emit and
change their behaviors accordingly? It may be premature to answer
now. Behaviors which are illicit and punishable are often performed
only when a dolphin believes no one is around (e.g., Savage-Rumbaugh
and Hopkins, 1986). When a dolphin squirts water at a human (to show
annoyance), he will often raise his head out of the water to
curiously observe the effect his behavior had on the unsuspecting
victim (personal observation). Both examples show an awareness of
effects one's behavior has on others. Dolphins demonstrate what
Pryor (1986) calls insightful behavior. An experienced animal will
"check out" a training criteria by running through a series of
variations on a learned behavior. Development of a productive
communicative skills in dolphins, such as mimicry, would benefit
many areas of investigation. "Future work on artificial systems
should pursue the development of phoneme-like set of recombinable
sound patterns which optimize perceptual distinctiveness and
reproducibility" (Richards, 1986). The integration of
representational and communicative systems, as partly demonstrated
by the impairment effect (Premack, 1985), have yet to be extensively
explored in dolphins. Even instruction in the use of lexigram
systems would start to resolve some questions concerning dolphin
cognitive and linguistic abilities.

The human brain appears to better organized to impose structure on
visual data than on auditory data, and in the dolphins the reverse
may be true. Forestell and Herman (1986) report indirect evidence
that an object is more an object (e.g., perceived as contiguous)
when it is heard than when it is seen by a dolphin. The kind of self
that might be constructed by dolphins probably involves acoustic
more than visual inputs. Echolocation shares an unusual structural
feature with human language: its contribution to the reality
constructed by the brain may depend on a signal generated by other
animals. Various social interactions in bats, such as foraging and
agonistic behaviors, depend on the ability to intercept the vocal
signals of others (Fenton, 1980). Why did many species of dolphins
attain such large brains? In view of their high cost, we must
propose enhancements of data from echolocation (Jerison, 1988).
Co-occurrence of communicative and perceptual processes in the same
modality would create tremendous pressure for a communally-shared
symbol system. Echolocating animals can possibly share raw acoustic
information, unprocessed, the very elements from which
representational and communicative codes are developed. Integration
of representational and communicative systems in dolphins may not be
as much a unifying process as less segregation at the outset. Lilly
(1967) believed that dolphins were unable to distinguish their sonar
from their communications. One's concept of self is tied to the ways
and degree of acquiring knowledge. Sharing the very vividness of
natural objects would result in intense group cohesion with a
reduction of individuating processes. This communal experience may
change the boundaries of the self: many members of a group may act
as a "decision-making unit" (Jerison, 1986).

Different animals are conscious of different aspects of their world,
from proprioceptive body awareness to awareness of agency and social
agency (Cheney & Seyfarth). The extent of mental attribution in
humans ("linguistic self consciousness", Crook, 1983) may be a
consequence of extensive integration of representational and
communicative systems, channeled by social demands. During human
evolution, elements of intra-individual communication (cognitive
structures and processes) became progressively linked to and
developed with elements of interindividual communication (displays,
calls). This integration requires tremendous expenditures in terms
of time and other resources to develop and maintain in the members
of a culture. Poets, artists, scientists, and other creative members
of society may develop a higher degree of integration of these two
symbol systems during ontogeny and work very hard to maintain this
desegregration of abilities as adults. "The quality and range of
intellectual performance demonstrated by any member of a species is
in part a function of the breadth and intensity of the long- term
education that individual has received" (Herman,1986). The role
education plays in a species' representational and communicative
systems cannot be overlooked. Nonlanguage-trained animals perform
worse in tasks which require complex manipulation or mental
representations than language-trained animals in similar tasks
(Premack, 1985, see above). Language- trained dolphin & signing
human both process patterns hierarchically, more so than controls
(Shyan & Herman,1987). As with apes, we must admit that there is no
convincing evidence for a sophisticated language in the natural
communications of dolphins. However, we must also admit that the
basic component(s) of dolphin signaling is still largely unknown
(Smith,1986). Proponents of continuity theory can take comfort from
other findings, such as mimicry, observational learning,
protocultural influences on behavior, pedagogy, and the attribution
of minds in others: all of which are telltale signs of the partial
integration of representational and communicative capacities of
mammals.

-DK
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Learning Outside The Lines: Two Ivy League Students With Learning
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Practical guide to achieving postschool goals who those labelled LD
or ADHD. --www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/ 068486598X/top100

Pediatric Epilepsy: Diagnosis and Therapy
by John M. Pellock, et al
Resource for child neurologists and interested professionals.
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Chicken Soup for the Recovering Soul
by Robert Ackerman, et al
Collection of stories on recovery from alcoholism and drug
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Parenting Children With ADHD: 10 Lessons That Medicine Cannot Teach
by Vincent J. Monastra
Addresses basic problems and guidelines, including importance of a
lesson plan, how to teach children to manage their anger, why
nutrition is critical and why yelling rarely solves anything.
--www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/1591471826/top100

The Treatment of Epilepsy
by Simon D. Shorvon, et al
Systematic review of contemporary therapy in epilepsy.
--www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0632060468/top100

Brain Mapping: The Methods, Second Edition
by Arthur W. Toga, John C. Mazziotta
Methodology of functional neuroimaging -- a must for any cognitive
neuroscientist or neuropsychiatrist. --www.amazon.com/
exec/obidos/ASIN/0126930198/top100

Clinical Neurophysiology
by Jasper R. Daube
Covers the range of neurophysiological approaches to the diagnosis
and management of neurologic disease. --
www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/019514080X/top100

Different Brains, Different Learners: How to Reach the Hard to Reach
by Eric Jensen
Practical guide with teaching strategies to reach underachieving
children. --www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/ 1890460087/top100

Clinical Neurophysiology at the Beginning of the 21st Century
by International Congress
Overview of clinical neurophysiology in diagnosis, prognosis and
management of peripheral and central nervous system disorders.
--www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0444504990/top100

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JOURNAL PAPERS

Psychiatric disorders in parents of children with autism : Parents
of children with autism were found to have more psychiatric
difficulties than other parents.
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15660645

Neurogenesis in the adult. : Impairment of adult neurogenesis may be
one of the culprits behind certain brain diseases, like depression,
epilepsy, and neurodegenerative disorders.
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15662080

Human brain imaging and substance abuse. : Neuroimaging studies have
revealed an acute increase in dopamine release after drug abuse,
often followed by hypofunction after chronic use, and cue
exposure-induced activation of the frontal cortex.
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15661624

Functional connectivity in working memory task in high-functioning
autism. : Activity in prefrontal regions was more correlated with
left parietal regions for controls and the right parietal regions
for the autism group.
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15652316

Reduced size and abnormal asymmetry of parietal cortex in women with
BPD : Smaller hippocampal size is found in BPD and PTSD, possibly
reflecting a neurodevelopmental deficit of the right hemisphere in
BPD.
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15652877

Functional neuroimaging and cognitive rehabilitation for TBI :
Reviews current literature on functional neuroimaging after
traumatic brain injury, relating these findings to cognitive
rehabilitation.
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15632490

Reduced Anterior Corpus Callosum in Cocaine- Dependent Subjects. :
Reduced integrity of anterior corpus callosum white matter in
cocaine users is related to impaired impulse control.
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15637640

Collaborative problem solving in affectively dysregulated children :
A cognitive-behavioral model of intervention produced improvements
across multiple domains of functioning at posttreatment
andfollow-up.
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15612861

For the law, neuroscience changes nothing and everything. : Review
and speculation of the promise cognitive neuroscience holds for
explaining the operations of the mind and misbehavior.
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15590618

Mental illness and substance abuse disorders among juvenile
offenders : Of the incarcerated juveniles in Mississippi, most met
criteria for one mental disorder one-third had co-occurring mental
health and substance abuse disorders.
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15626325



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Upcoming Courses

A Pathway to Brain Regulation - Neurofeedback helps improve
neuroregulation. It's used by health care professionals for ADHD,
depression, anxiety disorders, LD, mood disorders, and behavioral
problems. This 4-day course, Neurofeedback in a Clinical Practice,
provides the basis for using Neurofeedback clinically. - *28 CEs

4-Day Comprehensive Course Dates

Boston MA Apr 7-10
Chicago IL, May 19-22
Alexandria, VA Jun 23-26

Our course is a hands-on experience right from the start. Attendees
consistently say this format is a very good way to learn
Neurofeedback.

"Neurofeedback should be viewed as one of the three essential or
primary forms of intervention - psychotherapy, psychopharmacology,
and Neurofeedback. In my experience, neurofeedback is every bit as
important and powerful as the other two forms of treatment." - Dr.
Laurence Hirshberg of Brown University Medical School, a
psychologist specializing in Developmental Disorders and Autism.

Contact Karie Kramer, our training coordinator, for more information
818-789-3456 ext 847 or see www.eegspectrum.com/Training

*EEG Spectrum International, Inc. is approved by the APA to offer
continuing education to psychologists. ESII maintains responsibility
for the program.


Conferences for Neurofeedback Clinicians & Researchers
CONFERENCE LOCATION DATES

AAPB - http://www.aapb.org Austin TX Apr 1-4
SABA - http://www.skiltopo.com Anchorage AK Jun 6-12
ISNR - http://www.isnr.org Denver CO Sep 8-11
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