Hello all

This concerns whether to pursue a popular campaign to DU munitions.

I have received offlist replies from two list members of du-watch,
concerning a ban on DU.

I would rather receive replies where everyone can read and judge. I am not
the only person interested in this question. No-one's going to destroy my
self-esteem by delivering their death-blow to my argument.

The gist of the offline comments is that to pursue a ban is to take the
wrong path. While one reply makes more detailed reference to the illegality
of DU under international treaties, neither addresses the efficacy of local
bans.

The Australian experience of banning uranium transport through local
communities had no direct support from international laws or treaties. It
was based on developing a widespread and popular understanding that uranium
mining contributes to the risk of nuclear war. That was a conclusion of the
Ranger Uranium Inquiry of the mid'70's.

We ( I say we, but my own role was inconsequential - I was one of thousands
who engaged in a successful campaign) We stopped uranium mining altogether
for several years, then saw a "three mines" policy accepted in Australia
which has stayed in place ever since. For over 30 years, Australia has been
limited to supplying "the world" with uranium from only 3 mines: Ranger,
Beverly and Olympic Dam.

This national policy is now under threat from the current, elected,
Australian government. Wide publicisation of the illegality of DU weapons
under existing international law will help keep uranium in the ground here,
and to that extent, help keep growing amounts of uranium oxides out of the
air, water and surface soils everywhere.

I believe bans could also play an important role in ceasing this obscene
tilling of radioactive soil, this digging-up of isolated, concentrated
uranium deposits, then spreading the uranium worldwide, through acts of war.

But what is to be gained by pretending that it is politically incorrect to
speak of a ban on DU weapons? Why not promote the idea of bans on the
community, state and national levels? Why not use the idea of a DU weapons
ban to name and shame investment bodies and individual investors?

Campaigns based on ethical investment may use the word "ban" to strengthen
the assault on DU munitions. An ethical investment campaign is delivering
results on cluster munitions, in Europe, right now.

Karen Parker is right, DU weapons are already outlawed. But her access and
expertise, to extend recognition of the fact and make it a popular
perception and expactation that DU weapons use is a war crime, are are of
limited value if people feel that the job is to be left to the experts in
international law.

I say it is tactical blunder to pretend that a ban on DU is so wrongheaded,
that a ban on DU is so wrong-headed, that it is to be shunned and made
unmentionable on a list for discussion of DU issues.

Robert
Hobart





----- Original Message -----
From: <du-watch@yahoogroups.com>
To: <du-watch@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Friday, July 07, 2006 11:45 PM
Subject: [DU-WATCH] Digest Number 1462



There is 1 message in this issue.

Topics in this digest:

1. Hazmat Transport - rolling bombs
From: R Rands


Message
________________________________________________________________________

1. Hazmat Transport - rolling bombs
Posted by: "R Rands" rrands@... dominouglias
Date: Thu Jul 6, 2006 6:20 pm (PDT)

DU-based dirty bombs need stopping, now. Would this not best be addressed
by a ban?

-=-=-=-=-=-=

Hazardous-materials trucks: terror threat?
Technology could reduce the risk by a third, but at a cost of $1.1 billion
to the industry.

By Mark Clayton | Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
from the July 07, 2006 edition

When he crisscrossed the East Coast in his big rig, New Jersey truck driver
Bob Grant hauled everything from baby powder to rocket fuel. His specialty
was hazardous materials, or hazmats, such as gasoline, butane, and diesel
fuel.

[photo caption] HAZMAT: This load of radioactive waste in 2001 is one of
800,000 hazardous shipments that hit US roads daily, offering targets for
terrorists, some experts say.
LIAISON/FILE

Then came 9/11. Worried that terrorists would hijack his tanker truck and
use it as a weapon, Mr. Grant switched to dump trucks and retired a few
years later.

His jitters reflect a growing concern about terrorist truck bombs. In
Tunisia in 2002, a suicide terrorist linked to Al Qaeda detonated a propane
tanker beside a synagogue, killing 21 people. A 2004 visit to Iraq by
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was punctuated by a fuel-truck attack that
burned a section of Baghdad. These and scores of other truck attacks
worldwide have fueled a growing debate over whether the United States is
vulnerable to a similar strike. Last August, the FBI warned of a possible
fuel-truck attack in a major US city.

The federal government's post-9/11 programs are enough to protect hazmat
trucking, say federal officials and trucking organizations. Some security
experts say more needs to be done. At issue: Should the government force the
industry to spend $1.1 billion - about $5,500 per truck - on new
technologies that could reduce the truck-bomb threat by a third?
"If you gave me a tanker truck and a phosphorous bomb, I could make a huge
explosion anywhere I want," says Randy Larsen, an analyst with the Institute
for Homeland Security in Alexandria, Va., a nonprofit consulting firm.
"Hazmat security should be among the Top 10 national concerns, but we don't
act like it is."

Ever since Timothy McVeigh drove an explosive-laden truck into the garage of
the Alfred Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995, Americans have
been aware of truck bombs. But Mr. McVeigh's homemade bomb was only 2 tons.
Large hazmat 18-wheelers - Class 6 trucks - can haul 20 times as much
weight.

Every day, some 800,000 hazmat loads hit the road, carrying everything from
chlorine and gasoline to liquefied natural gas and radioactive material each
year, according to a recent study by the Transportation Security
Administration. Nearly 2 in 5 of those shipments are classified as "extreme
risk."

Such shipments are "dangerous and ready-made weapons," the Department of
Transportation concluded in 2004, and are "especially attractive" to
terrorists.

Since 9/11, the federal government has tightened trucking security. The
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) began in 2004 requiring fingerprinting
and background checks on drivers with hazmat licenses. It also instituted a
"highway watch" program to help drivers spot threats. The Department of
Transportation also requires hazmat truck companies to have detailed
security plans.

"There is a much sharper realization among hazmat truckers since 9/11 that
you've got to be more alert," says John Conley, president of the National
Tank Truck Carriers Association. That includes "things as basic as locking
your truck. Our drivers understand their loads could be used in a bad way."

But these steps aren't enough, several industry observers say.

"Normal trucking operations are still an open invitation to a terrorist,"
says Todd Spencer, executive vice president of the Owner-Operator
Independent Drivers Association Inc. in Grain Valley, Mo. "Even now, five
years later, I don't know if they've really tightened up."

These observers point to multiple vulnerabilities. "My biggest concern is
that we've got pretty lax security at a lot of trucking terminals," says a
terminal manager for a large liquid bulk hazmat carrier on the East Coast,
who asked not to be named because he is not authorized to speak to news
media. "It's not uncommon at all to see several tankers already loaded with
hazmat, and the gates to these facilities are wide open most of the time.
It's inviting trouble."

Such vulnerability rises dramatically after a truck hits the open road.
Hijackers could take it by force, many agree.
Available technologies, however, could prove a major deterrent, says the
Transportation Department. Its 2004 study found eight technologies were
largely successful, including satellite-based communications, global
positioning tracking systems, remote vehicle-disabling devices, and "panic
buttons" that send out an instantaneous alert to law enforcement. Biometric
identification had some problems but was considered promising.

Such a portfolio of technologies could reduce the hijacking threat by about
36 percent, the DOT study concluded. At the same time, the technologies
could save the industry an estimated $4.1 billion through improved operating
efficiencies, it found.

As of 2003, nearly two-thirds of the nation's 115,000 fuel trucks had global
positioning systems and wireless communications - the basic platform for
more advanced systems. But only 12 percent had a panic button, and just 8
percent had remote vehicle disabling, the study found. And getting the
industry to adopt these might require government mandates - something the
industry opposes.

"We're not supporting the mandating of any technology simply because you are
a hazardous-materials transporter," Mr. Conley says. "Tell me what you're
hauling, and we'll tell if it makes sense."

Some truckers say the technology is vital. "I don't know why this technology
isn't moving faster into the industry," says Reggie Dupre, president of
Dupre Transport, which transports a range of hazardous materials in a
350-truck tanker fleet based in Lafayette, La.

During a year-long federal test, one of Mr. Dupre's drivers accidentally
bumped a "panic button" device. Within minutes, police had the rig
surrounded.

After explosion, new worries about LNG trucks

Tanker trucks carrying liquefied energy gases have worried terror experts
since the 1970s. Now, with shipments of liquefied natural gas (LNG) set to
soar in coming years alongside already robust shipments of liquefied
petroleum gas, some security experts are again sounding the alarm. Their
prime evidence: a truck accident in Spain.

Industry officials have long argued that LNG trucks are almost immune to
explosion. But in 2002, an LNG truck in Spain flipped over, burned, then
exploded into a 500-foot fireball that killed the driver and burned two
others.

"The severity of this kind of explosion is something people haven't usually
considered applicable to LNG trucks," says Jerry Havens, former director of
the Chemical Hazards Research Center at the University of Arkansas. "But
what happened in Spain changes that picture. It shows you've got the
potential for a massive explosion."

Despite the Spain incident, industry spokesmen say LNG is not explosive.

"We don't view LNG tractor trailers as a high target for any intentional
attacks whatsoever," says Bill Cooper, of the Center for Liquefied Natural
Gas, a coalition of energy providers. "It would not explode, just burn back
to its ignition source. Therefore you have to wonder if that's really a
target-rich environment."

When an LNG tanker truck flipped in Massachusetts in May and another LNG
tanker burned in Nevada last summer, neither produced an explosion, he
notes.

But if terrorists are involved, then the equation changes, Dr. Havens and
other experts argue. A hijacked LNG tanker truck could be rigged to explode
fairly easily, Richard Wilson, a Harvard physicist, warned in a 2003 speech.

One thing is clear: More LNG trucks will hit the road in coming years if the
federal government approves new LNG terminals at US ports.

http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0707/p02s01-usgn.html?s=hns
www.csmonitor.com | Copyright © 2006 The Christian Science Monitor. All
rights reserved.




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