>Date: Sun, 17 Jun 2007 20:07:30 -0400
>From: anna.rudy@... ("anna.rudy")
>Subject: Seegobin Crown Factum for s.24 MedPot
>To: MedPot-discuss@yahoogroups.com

PART 1 - RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT AS TO FACTS

In this proceeding, the Applicant, Rudy Seegobin (the
"Applicant) has applied to a justice, pursuant to section 24
of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (the "CDSA"), for
the return to him of marijuana seized by the police on July
24, 2006. The Respondent opposes this application.

RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. On July 24, 2006, following a traffic stop by OPP Cst.
John Sucee, the Applicant, Rudy Seegobin was found to be in
possession of 77.1 grams of cannabis marijuana.1

2. On July 24, 2006, the Applicant was subject to a
probation order following a conviction for cultivating
marijuana. The Applicant received a conditional discharge.2

3. On July 24, 2006, the Applicant did not possess proper
authorization to possess pursuant to the Marijuana Medical
Access Regulations (MMARs).

4. As a result of the seizure on July 24, 2006, two charges
were laid against the Applicant: i) possession of cannabis
marijuana greater than 30 grams contrary to s.4(1) of the
CDSA, and, ii) breach of probation contrary to s. 733.1 of
the Criminal Code.3

JCT: They forgot to mention that on July 27, police raided
his home grow-op and charged him with the the S.7(1)
marijuana cultivation offence.

5. On November 29, 2006, a trial date of April 13, 2007 was
set.

6. On January 15, 2007 Mr. Seegobin was issued a personal
use production license (PPL) under the MMARs. Under the
terms of this license, he was entitled to grow no more than
25 plants and possess at one time 150 grams of cannabis
marijuana.

JCT: Charges in Perth were stayed.

7. On February 12, 2007, the Applicant served the Crown with
a Notice of Application, under s. 24 of the CDSA, for the
return of the seized marijuana.

JCT: And for Prohibition of Prosecution a la Krieger.

8. On February 14, 2007, the charges of possession of
cannabis marijuana s. 4(1) of the CDSA and the breach of
probation contrary to s. 733.1 of the Criminal Code were
stayed at the request of the Crown.

JCT: But he didn't have a legitimate exemption at the time
of the offence, only a legitimate medical need.

9. While it appears moldy, the cannabis marijuana seized
from the Applicant still remains in police storage.4

JCT: If they ruined it, they can pay their estimated value,
usually about 10 times more than the street value.

PART TWO- THE RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT

It is the Respondent's submission that:
i) if one reviews the jurisprudence there is no such thing
as a "court-granted Hitzig exemption"; and
ii) ss.24 to 27 of the CDSA provides a complete roadmap for
determining whether the Applicant is entitled to the return
of the seized marijuana. The Applicant has failed to: a)
bring the Application within 60 days of seizure as per the
requirements of the legislation;

JCT: So he can ask for an extension of time.

and, b) establish that he was legally entitled to possess
marijuana on the date of seizure, July 24, 2006.

JCT: He was legally in medical need at the time.

The Respondent submits that given these failings, this Court
is without jurisdiction to issue the Order requested by the
Applicant. As such, the Respondent requests that the
Application be denied.

A. The "Court-Granted Hitzig Exemption"

10. The Applicant states in his Application that there
exists a legal remedy known as a "court-granted Hitzig
exemption" with respect to the prohibition against
possession of cannabis marijuana.

11. As such, the Applicant states that he was entitled to a
"court-granted Hitzig exemption" on the date that the
marijuana was seized (July 24, 2006). Therefore, the
argument follows that his possession of cannabis marijuana
at that time was lawful.

12. The Applicant based this argument on four cases: Hitzig
v. Canada, R. v. Krieger6, R. v. Seegobin7 and R. v. Derek
Francisco.

13. The Respondent respectfully submits that-on the review
of the case law-there is no such thing as a "court-granted
Hitzig exemption". This argument will be explained by
reference to the judicial background behind Hitzig. The
analysis commences with consideration of the Ontario Court
of Appeal decision in R. v. Parker.

(a) R v. Parker (Ontario Court of Appeal)

14. On December 10, 1997, Sheppard J. stayed proceedings
brought against Terry Parker for cultivating marijuana
contrary to the Narcotic Control Act, and for possessing
marijuana contrary to the CDSA. Sheppard J. concluded that
Mr. Parker required marijuana to control his epilepsy, and
that the prohibition against marijuana infringed on the
Applicant's rights under section 7 of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms. The judge read into legislation an
exemption for persons possessing or cultivating marijuana
for their "personal medically approved use."8

5. On appeal, the Ontario Court of Appeal concluded that the
trial judge was correct in finding that the Applicant needed
marijuana to control the symptoms of his epilepsy, and that
the prohibition on the cultivation and possession of
marijuana was unconstitutional. The Court held that the
possibility of an exemption under s. 56 of the CDSA was
dependent upon the unfettered and unstructured discretion of
the Minister of Health and was thus inconsistent with the
principles of fundamental justice. However, the Court
disagreed with Sheppard J.'s remedy of reading into
legislation an exemption for medical use, stating that this
was a matter for Parliament to resolve. The Court,
therefore, declared the prohibition against possession of
marijuana as set out in subsection 4 (1) of the CDSA to be
invalid, but suspended the declaration of invalidity for one
year to provide the Government of Canada with an opportunity
to respond.9

(b) Marijuana Medical Access Regulations (the MMARs)

16. In responding to the Ontario Court of Appeal's decision
in R. v. Parker, the Government of Canada enacted, on July
30, 2001, the Marijuana Medical Access Regulations (the
"MMARs").10 The MMARs to possess marijuana (an "ATP"), and
a personal-use production licence (a "PPL") to permit the
production of marijuana for medical purposes or a designed-
person production licence (a "DPL") to permit a designated
person to grow marijuana on behalf of an ATP holder.

JCT: The Court of Appeal ruled it had not provided so.

An ATP is issued to persons ordinarily resident in Canada
who, with the advice and support of their medical
practitioner(s), can demonstrate medical need. A PPL or DPL
permits the holder of the licence to, among other things,
produce marijuana in quantities up to a specified maximum.

(c) Hitzig et al.v. Canada (Ontario Superior Court)

17. In the fall of 2002, three civil applications (Turmel,
Paquette and Hitzig) concerning marijuana for medical
purposes

JCT: It was Parker, Turmel and Paquette, Hitzig, et al, and
Turmel wasn't sick so ours wasn't for medical purposes.

were heard together by Lederman J. of the Ontario Superior
Court of Justice. On January 9, 2003, Lederman J. released
his decision which concluded that the absence of a legal
supply of marijuana for authorized persons offended basic
tenets of the legal system and was inconsistent with the
principles of fundamental justice. Lederman J. therefore
declared the MMARS to be unconstitutional and invalid on the
grounds that the framework failed to adequately resolve
issues related to source and supply of marijuana. However,
Lederman J. suspended the declaration of invalidity for six
months so as to permit the Government of Canada an
opportunity to amend the MMAR or otherwise provide a legal
source of supply of marijuana for those persons authorized
to possess under the MMARs.11 All parties appealed the
decision of Lederman J.

JCT: Parker and Turmel-Paquette appealed and are styled as
Appellants; the Crown and the Hitzigs as Respondents.

(d) Hitzig et al. v. Canada (Ontario Court of Appeal)

18. The Ontario Court of Appeal released its decision in the
Hitzig matter on October 7, 2003. This decision contains
ruling in regard to three related appeals.

JCT: That's why not styling the case after the Appellant
Parker but after the Respondent Hitzig is so crooked.

The Court of Appeal determined that the MMARs were
constitutionally defective insofar as they did not provide
for reasonable access to a legal source of supply of
marijuana for medical purposes, as some authorized persons
were dependent on illegal sources to obtain the marijuana
that the MMARs authorized them to possess.

JCT: The MMARs were defective, no "insofar" limiting the
decision that the MMARs didn't constitutionally work.

In addition, the Court determined to be unconstitutional the
requirement for some applicants to have the support of a
second specialist to establish medical need. The Court
remedied the constitutional deficiencies that it had
identified by declaring the following provisions of the
MMARs to be invalid:
a. the prohibition in subsection 34 (2) against compensating
the holder of a DLP for growing marijuana and supplying it
to the holder of the ADP;
b. the provision in subsection 41 (b) preventing a DLP
holder from growing marijuana for more than the ADP holder;
c. the prohibition in section 54 against DLP holders
producing marijuana in common with more than two other DLP
holders; and
d. the provisions in paragraph 4(2) (c) and section 7
requiring a declaration by a second specialist.

19. As the Court remedies these deficiencies, the MMARs, as
modified by the Court, continued to be constitutional,

JCT: They could not continue to be constitutional when they
were unconstitutionally invalid a moment before. Seems to be
a standard Crown misconception.

and thus the prohibition on the possession of marijuana,
under the section 4 of the CDSA, continued to be
constitutional as well.

JCT: It "continued to be constitutional" after being
unconstitutional?

The Applicant's argument appears to be based on a
misunderstanding of the order and reasons for decision of
the Court of Appeal in Hitzig. The reasons for decision of
the Court of Appeal clearly indicate that section 4 of the
CDSA was not repealed: 12

JCT: The Court contradicted Parliament. So who will the
judges obey, Parliament or a Court?

[166] The declarations of the invalidity we propose remove
the single unconstitutional barrier to eligibility and
sufficient barriers to supply that ADT holders will be
reasonably able to meet their medical needs from licit
sources. As a result, the MMAR as modified become a
constitutionally sound medical exemption to the marijuana
prohibition in s. 4 of the CDSA. .

JCT: Since the court says they "become constitutional," why
does the Crown say they "continued to be?"

[170] In R. v. Parker, supra, this court declared the
prohibition invalid as of July 31, 2001 if by that date the
Government had not enacted a constitutionally sound
exemption. Our decision in this case confirms that it did
not do so. Hence the marijuana prohibition in s. 4 has been
of no force or effect since July 31, 2001. Since the July 8,
2003 regulation did not address the eligibility deficiency,
that alone could not have cured the problem. However, our
order had the result of constitutionalizing the medical
exemption created by the Government. As a result, the
marijuana prohibition in s. 4 is no longer inconsistent with
the provisions of the Constitution. Although Parliament may
subsequently choose to change it, that prohibition is now no
longer invalid, but is of full force and effect. Those who
establish medical need are simply exempted from it.

JCT: Bingo. The Hitzig exemption.

This consequence removes the cloud of uncertainty from the
marijuana prohibition in s. 4 of the CDSA - a cloud which we
were told in argument has created very considerable
confusion for courts and law agencies alike.

[171] Second, in argument, counsel for the Government
strongly urged that if we found the MMAR to be
constitutionally flawed, we should be as precise as possible
in specifying the corrective measures to be taken. Our
remedy quite precisely determines the barriers on the MMAR
which, if removed, would render it a constitutionally sound
medical exemption to s. 4 of the CDSA. Our order represents
a minimal intrusion on the Governments scheme of medical
exemption. It leaves untouched the licensed possession
aspect of the scheme and modifies the licensed production
aspect of it only enough to make it constitutionally
acceptable.

20. These passages from the decision in Hitzig clearly
reveal that the court did not determine section 4 of the
CDSA to be an enactment that had been repealed.

JCT: No, they did not obey the Interpretation Act which says
laws that have been struck down are to be deemed repealed
but instead said that laws struck down are to be deemed
absent until fixed by the courts or Parliament. They sure
got a lot of crime out of that one Hitzig judgment.

Instead, the Court determined that the marijuana prohibition
within section 4 of the CDSA was inoperative from July 31,
2001, until October 7, 2003, but thereafter the prohibition
continued to be operative. (e) Hitzig et al. v. Canada
(Supreme Court of Canada)

JCT: Judges can't say to ignore the Interpretation Act and
deem it inoperative until fixed.

21. Hitzig and others sought leave to appeal the October 7,
2003, decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal. On May 6,
2004, their application for leave to appeal was dismissed by
the Supreme Court of Canada.

22. John Turmel sought leave to appeal the October 7, 2003,
decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal. On March 11, 2005,
Turmel's application for leave to appeal was dismissed by
the Supreme Court of Canada.

JCT: Hitzig was dismissed for lack of merit, Turmel was
dismissed as abandoned for failure to get 1 document in on
time. Not on the merits.

23. On April 6, 2006, the Supreme Court dismissed Terry
Parker's application for leave to appeal.

JCT: As abandoned, not on the merits.

24. The respondent submits that the review of the case law
permeating from Hitzig illustrates there does not exist a
"court-granted Hitzig exemption". In the case of Mr. Hitzig,
the "exemption" was not as much as a true exemption, but the
fact that Justice Lederman of the Ontario Superior Court
ruled the MMARs were constitutionally unsound. This
situation has since been remedied (as described in the
Ontario Court of Appeal in R v. Hitzig).

JCT: Not deemed "repealed," but deemed "unsound." They just
can't use the wording in the legislation and have to keep
using "inconsistent," "unsound," "absent" for "repealed."

(f) R. v. Krieger (Alberta Court of Appeal)

25. In his Application, the Applicant submitted that "I
sought an order quashing all my charges relating to
marijuana under s. 7(1) and 5(2) of the CDSA as unknown to
law on the grounds Parliament has not re-enacted s. 7
cultivation (and by implication s.4 possession) prohibitions
since they were struck down by the Alberta Court of Appeal
in R. v. Krieger on December 4, 2002."

JCT: And didn't get a stay by Feb 2 2003, 60 days. To get
through the Crown's chaff camouflaging the truth, I just
dropped all references to the trafficking charge and the
true story on the cultivation charge remained:

<<26. In 1999, Grant Krieger was charged with the offences
of production of marijuana (contrary to subsection 7(1) of
the CDSA)...
He brought a motion seeking a declaration that these
provisions of the CDSA violate section7 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. On December 11, 2000,
pursuant to subsection 24(1) of the Charter, Acton J. struck
down subsection 7(1) of the CDSA and stayed the charge
against Krieger in respect of subsection 7(1) of the CDSA...
On appeal, in a decision pronounced on December 4, 2002, the
Alberta Court of Appeal confirmed the ruling which struck
down subsection 7(1) of the CDSA...
On December 23, 2003, the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed
an application for leave to appeal from this decision of the
Alberta Court of Appeal.>>

27. In short, the Krieger decisions contain a ruling that
the production offence (subsection 7(1) of the CDSA) was
contrary to the Charter in respect of Krieger.

JCT: Not only law for Krieger but law for Canada.

28. The Krieger rulings have no bearing on the hearing of
this Application for a number of reasons.

29. First, since they emanate from Alberta courts, they are
not binding on Ontario courts.

JCT: Must it be struck down in all 14 provinces?

As well, these rulings on the production offences have no
bearing on the possession offence under section 4 of the
CDSA.

JCT: Supreme Court note and the Crown David Frankel in the
case say "cultivation, and by implication, possession."

Furthermore, the decision of Acton J. in Krieger was in
respect of the events that pre-dated the MMARs, and Acton
J.'s decision was issued prior to the Ontario Court of
Appeal's decision in Hitzig, and thus the decision of Acton
J. has been superceded by the MMARs and the subsequent
decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal.

JCT: Acton, supported by the Alberta Court of Appeal, cannot
be superceded by the Ontario Court of Appeal. Forgetting to
mention that her decision was backed up by their Court of
Appeal makes it sound like "the decision of Acton J. has
been superceded by the subsequent decision of the Ontario
Court of Appeal" when the decision of the Alberta Court of
Appeal cannot be. Leaving in the Alberta Court of Appeal's
role belies the Crown point.

B. Sections 24 to 27 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances
Act: the "Disposal of Controlled Substances" Provisions

30. In the Respondent's submission, the statutory scheme
governing the return of the controlled substances set out in
the CDSA provides a complete framework for the resolution of
the Application.

31. Section 24(1) of the CDSA states:

24(1) Where a controlled substance has been seized, found or
otherwise acquired by a peace officer or an inspector, any
person may, within sixty days after the date of the seizure,
finding or acquisition, on prior notification being given to
the Attorney General in the prescribed manner, apply, by
notice in writing to a justice in the jurisdiction in which
the substance is being detained, for an order to return that
substance to the person (emphasis added)

32. The Respondent submits that the key words in ss. 24(1)
are "any person may, within sixty days after the date of
seizure.

33. The Applicant failed to bring his application within
sixty days after the date of seizure of July 24, 2006. The
application was served on February 12, 2007, close to seven
months after seizure.

34. On a plain reading of ss. 24(1), the Respondent submits
that this Application should be dismissed for failure to
comply with the time limits delineated under 24(1) of the
CDSA.

JCT: If it's still on hand, as they say it is, an extension
of time is sought.

35. Every enactment is deemed remedial, and shall be given
such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation
as best ensures the attainment of its objects. Why is the 60
day time period important under this legislation? Because
under s. 25, if an application has not been made within 60
days, the peace officer can get the Minister of Health to
dispose of the quantity of the substance not required for
court purposes. In that regard, section 25 of the CDSA
states:
25. Where no application for the return of a controlled
substance has been made under subsection 24(1) within sixty
days after the date of the seizure, finding or acquisition
by a peace officer or inspector and the substance or a
portion of it is not required for the purposes of any
preliminary inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this
Act or any other Act of Parliament, the substance or the
portion not required for the purposes of the proceeding
shall be delivered to the Minister to be disposed of or
otherwise dealt with in accordance with the regulations or,
if there are no applicable regulations, in such manner as
the Minister directs. (emphasis added)

JCT: Fortunately, it hasn't been yet destroyed if it's
required for court purposes. So if it's still there, where's
the justice in denying it to its lawful owner?

36. Coming back to deciphering ss. 24(1) of the CDSA, the
word "may" contained within subsection 24(1) should be
construed as imperative. In usual cases, "may" is
permissive. However, when one considers the legislation as a
whole, the word "may" is imperative. The legislation - under
ss. 25 of the CDSA as discussed above - provides that the
controlled substances can be legally disposed by police on
an ex parte basis after the 60-day window. Therefore, if a
person such as the Applicant decides to exercise the option
of bringing an application to have seized controlled
substances returned, they must do so within 60 days.

JCT: Unless it's not been disposed of yet. There's no reason
justice should be denied if there's no fait accomplit.

37. The legislative scheme revolves around the sixty day
period. Furthermore, if the police have to destroy the drugs
because the drugs have become a health risk they can rely
upon section 26 of the CDSA at any time and go before a
justice on an ex parte basis.

JCT: That's not an issue here.

If someone within 60 days of seizure makes a claim under
24(1), they can be recompensed if the drugs have been
destroyed. Outside the 60 days, any Applicant is out of luck
for compensation:

JCT: So give him back what you can.

26.(1) Where the Minister has reasonable grounds to believe
that a controlled substance that has been seized, found or
otherwise acquired by a peace officer or inspector
constitutes a potential security, public health or safety
hazard, the Minister may, on prior notification being given
to the Attorney General in the prescribed manner, at any
time, make an application, ex parte, to a justice for an
order that the substance or a portion of it be forfeited to
Her Majesty to be disposed of or otherwise dealt with in
accordance with the regulations or, if there are no
applicable regulations, in such manner as the Minister
directs.

JCT: No indication that it's a potential hazard.

38. No provisions exist within the legislation for altering
the 60-day time period. Furthermore, the legislation didn't
use words such as "reasonable notice" or the like to frame
the time period for bringing an application The legislation
simply chose 60 days. Mr. Seegobin is outside that 60 day
time period to rely upon s. 24.

39. It is therefore the Respondent's submission that this
Court has no jurisdiction to consider Mr. Seegobin's
application under s.24(1) of the CDSA.

40. Furthermore, it appears that if the Respondent is asking
for the Court to adopt an elastic and liberal interpretation
of the section, it should be remembered that if the
Applicant brought the application in the correct 60-day time
period, it could not have been granted: he was not legally
authorized to possess marijuana at that time.

JCT: Actually, he was authorized by medical need even if
government were slow getting around to accepting it.

41. Also, the legal authority for the Applicant to possess
and cultivate marijuana under the PPL (issued January 15,
2007) does not retroactively now make his illegal possession
on July 24, 2006 legal.

JCT: No, medical need at the time made his possession legal.

42. However, if the Applicant fails to meet the criteria in
s.24 of the CDSA, that doesn't necessarily end the story for
the Applicant. The Applicant could try and get the cannabis
marijuana returned under section 27 of the CDSA:

27. Subject to section 24, where, pursuant to a preliminary
inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this or any other
Act of Parliament, the court before which the proceedings
have been brought is satisfied that any controlled substance
that is the subject of proceedings before the court is no
longer required by that court or any other court, the court
(a) shall
(i) where it is satisfied that the person from whom the
substance was seized came into possession of the substance
in accordance with the regulations and continued to deal
with it in accordance with the regulations, order that the
substance be returned to the person, or
(ii) where it is satisfied that possession of the substance
by the person from whom it was seized is unlawful and the
person who is lawfully entitled to its possession is known,
order that the substance be returned to the person who is
the lawful owner or is lawfully entitled to its possession;
and
(b) may, where it is not satisfied that the substance should
be returned pursuant to subparagraph (i) and (ii) or where
possession of the substance by the person from whom it was
seized is unlawful and the person who is the lawful owner or
is lawfully entitled to its possession is not known, order
that the substance be forfeited to Her Majesty to be
disposed of or otherwise dealt with in accordance with the
regulations or, if there are no applicable regulations, in
such manner as the Minister directs.

JCT: Good. They need a court order to dispose of it.

43. Certainly the first portion of the section is met. The
cannabis marijuana is no longer required for court purposes
since the charges were stayed.

JCT: Actually, since they've arrogated to themselves the
right to charge him again by staying the charges instead of
withdrawing them, they do have to keep the evidence around.

44. That stated, ss. 27(a)(i) of the CDSA provides that a
substance shall be returned "where [the Court] is satisfied
that the person from whom the substance was seized came into
possession of the substance in accordance with the
regulations.." (emphasis added)

45. On July 24, 2006, the Applicant did not come into
possession of the marijuana in accordance with the
regulations. His personal production licence issued by
Health Canada was not issued until January 2007.

JCT: But he had medical need at the time that was admitted
too late to help to help then but can now.

46. Subsection 27 (a)(ii) of the CDSA does not capture the
Applicant's situation. The Respondent submits that this
subsection is necessary to protect those individuals who can
legally possess a drug (for instance, a bottle of
prescription morphine), but then have the pills stolen by a
third party, who was later found in possession of the bottle
of prescription pills. Subsection 27 (a)(ii) is simply not
applicable to the Applicant's circumstances.

JCT: But the claim to the pills after 60 days if not
disposed of would be just as valid as it is now.

R. v. Seegobin (September 26, 2005)

47. The Applicant provides that sentencing decision of His
Honour Justice Selkirk as support for his argument that
there is a "court-granted Hitzig exemption".

48. The Respondent submits that Justice Selkirk's decision
is useful only to cast insight as to the reasons behind the
conditional discharge imposed for cultivation of cannabis.

49. If anything, the fact that a conviction was entered and
a sentence imposed reinforces the argument that there is no
such thing as a "court-granted Hitzig exemption."

JCT: Selkirk didn't know about Hitzig "be sick" exemptions
at the time but does establish he knew of Rudy's medical
need.

The Order in R. v. Derek Francisco

50. The Respondent submits that without knowing the facts of
the case (through proper foundation such as official
transcripts), no weight should be placed upon the Order of
the Ontario Court of Justice (Central East Region), made
August 21, 2006.

JCT: Except that being proven sick at the time of the
offence by receipt of a Health Canada Exemption seems to
prove that there was medical need at the of the offence to
get his equipment and herb back. Rudy got his equipment and
now it only remains to get his medicine back.

CONCLUSION

It is the Respondent's submission that:

1) There is no such thing as a "court-granted Hitzig
exemption": barring the issuance of a valid licence or
authorization to possess granted under the MMARs, possession
of cannabis marijuana remains a criminal offence. On July
24, 2006, the Applicant was not legally able to possess
cannabis marijuana.

JCT: Valid medical need was all the exemption he needed for
his rights to be violated.

2) The Applicant has failed to: a) bring the Application
within 60 days of seizure as per requirements of ss. 24 of
the CDSA

JCT: As long as it's not been disposed of, justice can be
done should legal ownership now be established. Because they
can't destroy anymore, after application, without a court
order.

3) The Respondent submits that given these failings, this
Court is without jurisdiction to issue the Order requested
by the Applicant. As such, the Respondent requests that the
Application be denied.

PART III- ORDER REQUESTED

The Respondent requests the following relief:
a) An order dismissing the Applicant's application for
return of a controlled substance; and
b) Such other relief as this Honourable Court determines to
be just.
Dated at Ottawa this 14th day of June, 2007
James Bocking
Of Counsel for the Respondent,
Attorney General of Canada

JCT: Rudy's claim will be heard in Ottawa on Aug. 17, 2003.


--
Abolitionist Debt Slave Leader John C."The Banking Systems Engineer"
Turmel for UNILETS interest-free time-based currency in U.N. resolution
C6 to Governments in the http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration.htm
http://www.cyberclass.net/turmel USENET blog: alt.fan.john-turmel