JCT: Finally, the last appeal. Keeping them in order:
1) Drouin uses Krieger to challenge cultivation prohibition;
2) Turmel uses Krieger to challenge "purpose" prohibition;
3) Turmel wanting jury trial for more than 3Kg;
4) Turmel wanting conviction set aside due to
a) medical preventative constitutional challenge;
b) defence of medical necessity;
c) defence of no intent to traffic.

File Number: #32013
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
(ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO)

BETWEEN:
John C. Turmel

Applicant
Appellant in appeal
and

Her Majesty The Queen

Respondent
Respondent in appeal

Response to Leave Application
Her Majesty The Queen
(Pursuant to Rule 27)

CR: PART I - RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS

Overview of the Respondent's Position

1. On May 14 2003, the Applicant was charged with possession
of marihuana for the purposes of trafficking pursuant to
section 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act
(CDSA). He was convicted by a judge sitting alone in the
Ontario Court of Justice on March 10 2006. The Applicant
admitted the facts but advanced the startling proposition
that he was not charged with an offence known to law. His
appeal from conviction to the Court of Appeal for Ontario
was dismissed. The Applicant asserts: (i) that he was not
charged with an offence known to law;

JCT: In Prohibition Appeal #32011

CR: (ii) That he should have been afforded the opportunity
to raise applications pursuant to the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms and (iii) the trial judge should have
permitted to raise the defence of necessity or the defence
of "no intent to traffic, only an intent to permit
inspection" before he was convicted. This application ought
to be dismissed for the following reasons.
a) The application has no merit.
b) The issues raised are not of national or public
importance.

JCT: Violating my right to life by denying me the
preventative benefits of the planet's most useful and benign
herb is a life and death issue.

CR: The Facts

2. On May 14 2003, the Applicant faxed a letter to the
Department of Justice stating that he had marihuana that he
was going to drop off at various locations in Ottawa,
including Parliament Hill, the Prime Minister's office, the
Attorney General of Canada and to this Court. The Applicant
was arrested on Parliament Hill that same day while holding
a bag containing approximately 3.3 kilograms of marijuana
packaged in 7 bags.

3. Between May 14 2003 (the day he was charged) and December
15 2005 (the day of his trial), the Applicant brought a
number of applications (in the form of prerogative remedies)
to prohibit the prosecution from continuing.

JCT: Actually, the number is two. The Aitken Prohibition 1
decision based on Parker extending to all sections including
5(2) once the word had to be off the list, and the MacLeod
Prohibition 2 decision based on Parker and Krieger extending
to all sections.

CR: He was unsuccessful and finally convicted by Belanger J.
of the Ontario Court of Justice on March 10 2006 on the
charge of possession for the purpose of trafficking
marijuana contrary to section 5(2) of the CDSA.

JCT: I was convicted then unsuccessful (because I'd just
been convicted)! Notice how the Crown puts the order
backwards to preserve the impression I lost the ruling on
the judge's jurisdiction before he tried me when he tried me
before the ruling on his jurisdiction could be obtained,
hence the rush to judgment.

CR: 4. The Applicant appealed rulings dismissing his
applications for relief and his conviction to the Court of
Appeal for Ontario. The appeals from his applications for
prohibition and certiorari were dismissed because they were
moot.

JCT: Once the lower judge rushed ahead so as to make moot
the ruling of the three superior judges above him? Har har
har.

CR: His conviction was upheld by the Court because in its
view the decision of R. v. Turmel (2003) 177 C.C.C. (3d) 533
(Ont.C.A.) and Hitzig v. Canada (2003) 177 C.C.C. (3d) 449
(Ont.C.A.) were binding

JCT: That's because the Chief Justice Roy McMurtry denied my
request for the 5 judges needed to overruled the 3 Hitzig
judges, thus stacking the deck.

CR: and that possession for the purpose of trafficking was
an offence known to law. They further found that as the
Applicant had admitted the Crown's case at trial,

JCT: Notice how they switch from admitting the facts to
admitting the case. Can you imagine me admitting the Crown's
case? Har har har har nyuk nyuk nyuk nyuk.

CR: he was properly convicted and that he was given full
opportunity to present written argument on any issue he
wished to raise prior to his conviction.

JCT: During the pre-trial "motion to quash" phase, I never
got another turn after the pre-trial decision came down
because my defence (between the pre-trial decision and the
conviction decision) was skipped.

CR: It is only after conviction, and without notice, that
the Applicant raised other issues.

JCT: It was actually after the pre-trial motion to quash had
been dismissed that I asked to raise my constitutional
issue, in the right order. But the judge handed down his
conviction at the same time as his dismissal of the ruling
to quash and then refused to let me go to the next defence
step.

CR: PART II - QUESTION IN ISSUE

5. The Notice of Application appears to pose essentially
three questions:
(i) Is the section 5(2) prohibition still known to law

JCT: No, that's being settled in my appeal for prohibition
in Leave Application #32011, the one linked to Pierre
Drouin's and Real Martin's applications to prohibit Section
7 cultivation charges so I can say I was charged while the
Krieger invalidation had taken effect in 2003 as well as the
now-admitted Parker invalidation after 2001. I wonder if
he's going to redo the answers from the #32011 case?

CR: (ii) Was it correct for the judge to refuse to hear the
Charter challenge for preventative medical use?

JCT: No, was it correct for him to infer that "I'm in big
trouble" means "I have no defence to offer?" is more the
issue.

CR: (iii) Should the judge have permitted the accused to
raise the defence of necessity or the defence of no intent
to traffic only an intent to permit inspection?

JCT: No, Should the judge have permitted the accused to
raise any defence which he skipped to rush to judgment? The
complaint isn't that he didn't permit a particular defence,
as if he refused to permit to raise it like many judges do,
but that he didn't permit me to raise any defence.

CR: PART III - ARGUMENT

A. The Application Is Without Merit Because The Offence Of
Possession For The Purpose of Trafficking Marijuana Has
Never Been Ruled Unconstitutional By Any Court in Canada

JCT: Yet. That's was the whole purpose of going on the Hill
with a life-sentence supply. Had I gone with under an ounce,
I'd be one of the 4000 others I got off the hook. But I
wanted to get everyone off the hook so I gambled on the "not
yet declared unconstitutional like possession" Section 5(2)
possession for the purpose of trafficking implied by the
large amount.
Anyway, the Crown's next few paragraphs repeat everything
from the #32011 prohibition case:

CR: 6. The heart of the Applicant's argument lies in his
interpretation of a period of uncertainty in the province of
Ontario with respect to the enforceability of the offence of
simple possession of marijuana under section 4(1) of the
CDSA. The period of uncertainty involved a very precise time
frame between July 31 2001 and October 7 2003. The
Applicant's argument is anchored on the Court of Appeal for
Ontario's decision in R. v. Parker (2000) 146 C.C.C. (3d)
193 (Ont.C.A.) where the Court found s.4(1) of the CDSA to
be of no force and effect to the extent that it failed to
address the issue of possession of marijuana by those who
required it for medicinal purposes to treat medical
conditions.

7. The uncertainty persisted until the Court of Appeal for
Ontario in a series of decisions in October of 2003 settled
the law in Ontario with respect to simple possession of
marijuana 'Hitzig v. Canada; R. v. J.P. (2003); and R. v.
Turmel. The Court of Appeal concluded (i) that as of October
7 2003, the prohibition on simple possession of marijuana
under section 4(1) of the CDSA was of full force and effect
and (ii) that the period of legal uncertainty applied "only"
to the offence of possession of marijuana simpliciter.

8. Indeed, the Applicant (who has never claimed that he has
a medical need for marijuana) was the appellant in one of
these rulings by the Court of Appeal for Ontario in October
2003 which made it clear that section 5(2) of the CDSA was
never struck down as unconstitutional by that court.

9. The Applicant filed a notice of appeal of that decision
with this court in early 2004 which was dismissed as
abandoned.

10. The Court of Appeal for Ontario rejected the Applicant's
argument "again" on Feb 23 2007 when it stated:
<<Mr. Turmel's enthusiastic arguments face an insurmountable
hurdle. This court has already rejected these types of
arguments.. and concluded that these offences remained in
full force and effect.>>

11. In summary, the declaration in Parker did not have the
effect of repealing Canada's marihuana laws nor did it
delete marijuana from Schedule II of the CDSA. The Applicant
continues to operate under a "fundamental misconception"
that during the period uncertainty legislation prohibiting
possession for the purpose of trafficking marijuana was
somehow "repealed." Given that the law with respect to
possession marijuana for the purpose of trafficking has
never been deemed to be of no force and effect, the
Applicant's conviction was proper, especially given that the
Applicant himself admitted at trial that "if the law's still
alive, I'm in big trouble."

JCT: Like I said, this is the issue in appeal #32011 and not
an issue in my conviction #32013 Leave Application. I've
answered earlier and won't answer here.

CR: B. The Application Is Without Merit Because The Trial
Judge Was Correct In Refusing To Allow The Applicant To
Raise Certain Defences AFTER He Was Convicted.

JCT: Actually, I did raise the issue of putting on my
defence right after the judge had dismissed my application
to quash on the grounds Krieger had made it unknown to law.
But the judge told me I couldn't go to step two because he'd
already written up the last step and was convicting me now.
So I did ask at the right time but before I found out the
conviction had already been written up. And rather than just
hand down the decision on the quash and omit the decision on
the conviction to permit me to make my defence, the judge
said it was too late since he'd already decided on
convicting me.

CR: 12. The Applicant's trial commenced on December 15 2005.
The Applicant admitted the Crown's case and the trial judge
invited the Applicant to make submissions to him as to the
state of the law in writing.

JCT: The state of the law being unknown was my pre-plea
motion to quash before bothering with preparing a long and
costly defence. And that's what I did. I did not write up
and hand in my "may not be necessary if charges quashed"
defence. I waited to find out if the trial would even
proceed.

CR: The trial was adjourned to March 10 2006,

JCT: For the decision on the motion to quash. If refused, I
had my Notice of Application for Constitutional Relief ready
to serve and file.

CR: however, the trial judge proceeded to hear the facts
surrounding the case to be read into the record - a
procedure consented to by the Applicant.

JCT: The judge even got me to agree to not making a defence?

CR: The following exchange took place:
<<THE COURT: Are those facts formally admitted, Mr. Turmel?
MR. TURMEL: Yes, they are, Your Honour.
THE COURT: Thank you. Now Mr. Turmel, do you wish to call
viva voce evidence in your defence?
MR. TURMEL: Well, I'd like to do that later, not now. I
mean, I don't mind the Crown's facts going in, but I would
rather not respond to it at this point in time, and if I
can, I'd wait to see if the charge is going to go through
after the application to quash.

JCT: Remember, the judge adjourned the decision on the
motion to quash the charge but then insisted on opening the
trial that might still be quashed!!

CR: THE COURT: That's the problem. Of course, I can go
through with the application to quash but it would've been
preferable to have a complete record of all of the case
before me. The Crown, here, has a prima facie case, but
you're entitled to call evidence. Not argument, now. The
argument, I'll hear, we've said...

JCT: I guess he couldn't bring himself to say "the argument,
I'll hear later."

CR: MR. TURMEL: Well then, I have no evidence. I'll have no
evidence to call, Your Honour.

JCT: All the evidence I would need was in the Crown's case.
The fact there were 3.277 Kilograms of marijuana and that
the officer heard me say that I was dropping it off for the
Prime Minister's inspection. What evidence more did I need
but the facts I'd already admitted? But because I had no
evidence didn't mean I didn't have any argument.

CR: THE COURT: I mean evidence, for example, to show that
you were not in possession, evidence to show that this was
not marijuana, any defence evidence.

JCT: No, I was only going to use the admitted facts provided
by the Crown's evidence.

CR: MR. TURMEL: No, nothing like that at all. Nothing like
that at all.
THE COURT: And can you tell me, just so I can gauge
properly, what it is that you might... And I'm not saying
that I'm forcing you if you say "I will call that evidence."
I'll leave that open, if that's your desire. But what would
be the nature of the evidence that you think of calling if
you did call evidence.
MR. TURMEL: I wouldn't have any evidence to call with
respect to those facts at all.

JCT: I had all the true facts on record so I can't imagine
what more evidence I needed.

CR: THE COURT: Okay.
MR. TURMEL: It would be strictly to do with the law, and if
the law's still alive, I'm in big trouble.

JCT: Then I'd have to do the preventative medical
constitutional challenge and the the "necessity" and
"inspection" defences, deductive reasoning not easily
followed by a legally-trained mind.

CR: THE COURT: Okay.
MR. TURMEL: That's my point. So there are going to be no...
I would probably, if the law is judge alive, maybe even
plead guilty, but I've stood mute. But, I just mean that
there's no defence to offer, and I'm not going to challenge
the facts.
THE COURT: And that was your point.
***
JCT: "No defence to offer" was certainly a mis-statement or
typo. I had plenty of defence ready to offer and no matter
what the judge thinks now that "no defence to offer" means,
when I did say I wanted to offer a defence, there was plenty
of time to have heard it. There was no need to deny me my
defence except to "mooten" the appeals against his
jurisdiction if he could convict me before they were heard.

CR: THE COURT: ... your desire. Fine. So I'll assume then
that on the basis of what you say, that the case is before
me.
MR. TURMEL: Yes.
THE COURT: ... on the facts.
MR. TURMEL: Yes.
THE COURT: And that there...
MR. TURMEL: There's nothing else coming.

JCT: On the facts, not the defence argument.

CR: THE COURT: There's no other evidence to be called on the
issue. (Emphasis added.)

JCT: And because there is no other evidence to be called on
the issue doesn't mean there is no other argument to be made
on the issue. (Emphasis added.)

CR: 13. As the above passage outlines in great detail, the
Applicant was given ample opportunity to raise any defence
he wished,

JCT: Any evidence I wished,

CR: but failed to do so.

JCT: Because the judge skipped the defence argument and
constitutional challenge parts of the defence.

CR: On March 10 2006 (after having previously provided with
written submissions by the Applicant and the Crown)

JCT: On the Motion to quash pre-trial, not the trial
arguments yet.

CR: the trial judge released a written judgment where he
found that the Applicant was charged with an offence known
to law

JCT: Now that my motion to quash had been dismissed and I
was going to have to defend against the charge was the time
to file my Constitutional Challenge. Then if the prohibition
isn't struck down, my defence arguments to the facts. But..

CR: and that because the Crown's case was admitted the
Applicant was guilty.

JCT: Because the Crown's facts were admitted, no need for
any defence, so skip to judgment.

CR: After his finding of guilt,

JCT: Completely unexpected when handed down with the
decision on the pre-trial motion to quash..

CR: and without notice to the Crown or the court, the
Applicant requested that the trial judge hear a
constitutional application

JCT: But at least I did have it ready for when I was
supposed to start Step 2 after the pre-trial motion was
over. But the judge had skipped Steps 2 and 3 in the defence
to issue judgment.

CR: The trial judge, quite properly, refused to hear the
application concluding that "there are rules of court and
you don't make an application at this late date without any
form of notice to anybody."

JCT: He's the guy who put things out of whack by starting
the trial before making his ruling on the pre-trial motion
to quash. From pre-trial to conviction with no defence in
between is the result, no matter that he got his conviction
registered before I had a chance to get my defence in.

CR: 14. The Court of Appeal for Ontario agreed with the
trial judge and its decision reveals no error.

JCT: They treated all three appeals in one process though
three different judgments still had to be issued and all
three are now being appealed. Does anyone really think they
got the facts straight? They're lawyers, the bottom of the
logic and mathematics barrel. So Justices Labrosse, Sharpe
and Blair think skipping from pre-plea motion to conviction
is okay. Now to get 3 Supremes on the same lampoon. Hoisted
on their own petards. Nyuk nyuk nyuk nyuk nyuk.

CR: 15. In any event, the Applicant's propose argument that
the possession of marijuana as a form of "preventative
medical use" has already been dismissed by the Court of
Appeal for Ontario in the decision of Hitzig v. Canada,
supra. The Applicant (who was as party to the appeal in
Hitzig)

JCT: Hitzig was trying to fix the exemption, I was trying to
prove the prohibition died on Terry Parker Day 2001. But
linking us lets the news of Alan Young's fight to fix the
exemption system drown out the news of John Turmel's fight
to kill the prohibition. So the Crown may not now how my
case differed from the medical users' case.

CR: claimed that the criminal prohibition of possession of
marihuana in section 4 of the CDSA was "genocide" because it
prohibited healthy Canadians from using marijuana to prevent
the onset of serious medical conditions such as epilepsy.

JCT: Sure that was my claim but the case had to do with
whether the MMAR exemption had saved the CDSA prohibition on
time and the court ruled it had not forcing the Crown to
drop all remaining 4000 possession charges across Canada.
Preventative use was always the constitutional challenge I
would have to raise if and when the court refused to quash
the charges as no longer known to law.

CR: 16. The Court of Appeal held that there was no medical
evidence presented that the smoking of marijuana by healthy
individuals had any prophylactic effect whatsoever

JCT: And now we've found that the Dr. Donald Tashkin, the
researcher who'd said marijuana causes lung cancer, has
reversed himself and provides evidence that it seems "to
have some protective effect." The clutz judges couldn't
follow the logical deduction that the engineer could and now
I've been proven right again the low-tech satraps wrong
again. Aaaaaaaaaahhhhhhhhhhhhhh.

CR: and that section 4 of the CDSA was only overbroad to the
extent that it applied to those who already had a serious
medical condition.

JCT: Judicial thinking, the beneficial effects only applied
to those who already had a serious medical condition. Nice
to see their errors exposed just on time. And the the Crown
to use their now-proven-wrong opinion here gives me the
chance to raise this new evidence in rebuttal!!

CR: 17. Having introduced no evidence to the Court of Appeal
for Ontario in 2003 that he had a serious medical condition
and that the marijuana he possessed was to treat such a
condition,

JCT: Notice the regular argument that the healthy guy isn't
sick. It just never dawns on them that their own line is
misleading them. The healthy guy wasn't claiming medical
need in this Parker Day Invalidation appeal, the healthy guy
was claiming the Invalidation for everyone, healthy too.

CR: there is every reason to believe that the Applicant's
argument that marijuana possession for preventative reasons
was doomed to failure.

JCT: Luckily, I had no medical need argument in seeking the
Terry Parker Day declaration. But if the Crown repeats
enough, the Court might be swayed. Har har.

CR: C. Should The Judge Have Permitted The Applicant To
Raise The Defence of Necessity Or The Defence Of No Intent
To Traffic Only An Intent To Permit Inspection

JCT: Keep in mind that when Ray Turmel tried to raise the
Necessity defence to grow for his sick wife, the judge
wouldn't allow it. Judges often disallow some defences.
Here, the Crown makes is sound like the judge dismissed my
request for these two defences when he actually refused my
request to put on any defence at all.

CR: 18. The response to this proposed ground of appeal is
subsumed in the preceding paragraphs. The Applicant is also
raising these defences for the first time on appeal.

JCT: Because the judge skipped them at the trial.

CR: The Applicant ought not be permitted to do so.

JCT: The judge ought not be permitted to skip to judgment so
too.

CR: As Justice L'Heureux-Dube stated in R. v. Brown [1993] 2
S.C.R. 918 at pp.923-924:
<<... the general prohibition against new argument on appeal
supports the overarching societal interests in the finality
of litigation in criminal matters.

JCT: Except the ground of the appeal is the denial of
opportunity to raise the defences below so raising them
above should not be affected by some general prohibition.

CR: Were there to be limits on the issues that may be raised
on appeal, such finality would become an illusion.

JCT: Of course, here the whole issue is about failure to get
the defence in below, not attempting to get new defence in
above.

CR: Both the Crown and the Defence would face uncertainty as
counsel for both sides, having discovered that the strategy
adopted at trial did not result in the desired or expected
verdict, devised new approaches.

JCT: Again, this was not a new defence approach after an old
defence approach had been defeated, it's the old defence
approach that never got heard below.

CR: Costs would escalate and the resolution of criminal
matters could be spread out over years in the most routine
cases. Moveover, society's expectation that criminal matters
will be disposed of fairly and fully at the first instance
and its respect for the administration of justice would be
undermined. Juries would rightfully be uncertain if they
were fulfilling an important societal function or merely
wasting their time. For these reasons, courts have always
adhered closely to the rule that such tactics will not be
permitted.>>

JCT: Again, these are not new defences raised at the top,
they are the old ones not raised below. Quite the
difference.

CR: 19. It bears repeating, the Applicant admitted that he
possessed marihuana for the purpose of trafficking

JCT: No, for the purpose permitting inspection.

CR: and his core submission at trial was that he was not
charged with an offence known to law.

JCT: At pre-trial. A Section 601 "unknown to law" motion to
quash isn't raised at trial. I didn't get any chance to
present any defence at trial. I only got the chance to
present this at pre-trial. Why can't lawyers ever keep
things straight?

CR: 20. The Applicant's claim regarding the defence of
necessity finds no support in the evidence.

JCT: That's it's good medicine for all these illnesses once
you've got them is not evidence that it's good as you're
getting them?

CR: As set out above, courts have already rejected the
Applicant's position that possession of marihuana has a
prophylactic effect on healthy Canadians including the
Applicant.

JCT: Don't the low-techs sound stupid now that Dr. Tashkin
has reversed his opinion?

CR: There is no evidence that the Applicant is in serious
medical need of cannabis marihuana to treat a medical
condition.

JCT: And I don't want to wait until there is.

CR: 21. The Applicant's claim regarding his intent is also
without merit. The offence of trafficking can encompass such
diverse activities as the sale, administering or
transportation of drugs. When the Applicant wrote the
following letter to the Department of Justice, he clearly
set out his intention to distribute marihuana:

JCT: For inspection, not sale or use.

CR: <<I will pick up my store of seven pounds of marijuana
and take it to Parliament Hill to openly smoke a joint as
M.P.s enter and dare the government to prosecute me under a
now dead law. Then I will be leaving a pound at the door of
Parliament for their inspection, leaving a second pound at
the Prime Minister's Office (it could help him quit
alcohol). Then I will go down to the Supreme Court of Canada
on Wellington Street to drop off a third pound, then across
the street to drop off a fourth at your Attorney General's
office, then I'll be going down Elgin Street to the Ontario
Provincial Courthouse and drop off a fifth pound, then off
down Elgin to the Ottawa Police station where I will drop
off my sixth pound - of course, if I get off Parliament
Hill.>>

D. This Application Raises no Issue of Public Importance

CR: 22. The law regarding the prohibition against possession
of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking is well settled.

JCT: Settled by the second R. v. Turmel Prohibition of
Prosecution appeal in which the court said they didn't have
enough judges for them not to be bound by the first R. v.
Turmel Prohibition appeal whose application for leave to
appeal to the Supreme Court was aborted by Justice Binnie
for getting one document in late?

CR: For approximately three years, the Applicant evaded a
trial on the merits

JCT: Just wanting to check the charge is valid before
wasting my time on defence against an invalid statute.

CR: by obtaining injunctions against prosecution in the
Superior Court of Justice disguised in the form of
prohibition or certiorari. Each of the applications was
properly dismissed and the trial judge's judgment in
convicting the Applicant reveals no error.

JCT: Always switching the time-frames. Those challenges to
the judge's jurisdiction were not dismissed and then I was
convicted, the judge rushed to convict before the appeals
against his jurisdiction could be heard. But if they want to
keep repeating the false timeline, I can keep repeating the
true one.

CR: The appeal from conviction was properly dismissed by the
Court of Appeal for Ontario.

JCT: This is argument? It's a wish list.

CR: This application is not deserving of the court's
attention.

JCT: The application of the engineer who proved all of
Canada's lawyers and judges wrong the last time isn't worthy
of attention, just because.

CR: 23. Manifestly, this application is an attempt by the
Applicant to advance the same startling proposition that he
made before the courts below. The Applicant is an
experienced litigant. He had every opportunity to raise any
defence he wanted to before the trial judge.

JCT: One whole issue here is that I did not.

CR: As the Applicant noted, having admitted the Crown's case
at trial

JCT: The Crown's facts... before the trial I never got.

CR: if his argument that he was not charged with an offence
known to law failed, a conviction was inevitable.

JCT: No, it was likely but defence could still prevail.

CR: It lies ill in his mouth to now complain that he was
never given an opportunity to raise other arguments
regarding the charge.

JCT: I guess it looks that way if you ignore that the judge
skipped from pre-trial to conviction without nothing in
between where a defence should have been.

CR: Given the history of the matter, there is every reason
to believe that these additional arguments are without
merit.

JCT: Given the history that I won the acquittal of 4000
Canadians because only I and none of Canada's judges or
lawyers knew the law was dead, it would seem that there is
every reason to believe that the additional argument have
merit.

CR: Leave to appeal should be refused.

PART IV - SUBMISSIONS CONCERNING COSTS

24. The respondent does not seek costs.

PART V - ORDER REQUESTED

25. The respondent requests that the application for leave
to appeal be dismissed.

ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

Dated at Toronto this 23rd day of May 2007.
Brian G. Puddington
Counsel for the Respondent
Attorney General of Canada.



--
Abolitionist Debt Slave Leader John C."The Banking Systems Engineer"
Turmel for UNILETS interest-free time-based currency in U.N. resolution
C6 to Governments in the http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration.htm
http://www.cyberclass.net/turmel USENET blog: alt.fan.john-turmel