B) The Appeals Do Not Involve A Significant Jurisdictional
Issue

17. A common theme advanced by the appellants is that the
Superior Court of Justice should have prohibited their
charges from proceeding because they are not charged with an
offence known to law. Putting aside the more obvious flaws
from the proposed defence,(18)
(18) The response to the submission that the appellants are
not charged with offences know to law is set out below.

prohibition is not available to restrain a judge from
proceeding with an information which does not disclose a
criminal offence or is defective in substance or form,
unless the statute under which the information was laid is
ultra vires.

JCT: Bingo!!! That's what we're saying. The court-
resurrected statute doesn't have the same power as a
Parliament legislated statute. I understand when Parliament
makes something go from legal to illegal but I don't
understand how the courts can make something go from legal
to illegal. Illegal to legal, yes, but legal to illegal,
that's only for Parliament. Parliament Only Legislates,
Courts Only Abrogate. POLCOA.

The issue as to whether or not an information discloses an
offence is a matter for the trial judge (19).
(19) R. v. Toronto Magistrates Ex Parte Bassett [1967] 1
C.C.C. 251 at 254 (Ont.C.A.) and R. v. Dnieper, Ex Parte
Rijimax Motors Ltd. (1969), 9 D.L.R. (3d) 661 at 664-5
(Ont.H.C.); affd, (1969), 9 D.L.R. (3d) 668 (Ont.C.A.)

18. The issues raised by the appellants on these appeals are
not jurisdictional in nature, and consequently, there was no
basis for a prohibition order.

JCT: For the two years since Aug. 1 2001 to Oct 7 2003,
every judge in Canada was enforcing an invalid statute. An
order prohibiting prosecution was the only way to tell them
all to stop.

It is well established that trial judge's rulings which
involve the following do not raise jurisdictional issues:
i) the interpretation of offence provisions in a statute;
and
ii) the constitutionality of legislation.
Clearly, if jurisdiction is not lost when a judge actually
makes a decision with respect to these matters, jurisdiction
could not be lost, where there is the potential for a
decision which could impact on these issues(18).
(18) R. v. Gilberg, [1975] 2 \V.\V.R. 171 at 175
(Alta.C.A.); R. v. Mills (1986), 26 C.C.C. (3d) 481 at 496
(S.C.C.), and R. v Jones, supra

C) Assuming That The Appeals Touch On A Jurisdiction
Question, A Prohibition Order Is Still Not Available In The
Cases At Bar

19. Simply because a matter comes before this court by way
of prohibition does not necessarily take it out of the
general rule that the court will not hear interlocutory
appeals in criminal matters. Courts will generally refuse to
issue a prohibition order unless the harmful consequences to
the applicant clearly outweigh the delay and fragmentation
of the trial resulting from the prohibition application.

JCT: Luckily, he can't show any fragmentation of the trials
of Drouin and Martin where the assignment judges saw no rush
to judgment necessary.

The decision whether or not to issue a prohibition order is
a discretionary matter and prohibition is only to be granted
in a substantially clear case of want of jurisdiction or
that there are very special or exceptional
circumstances.(21)
(21) Re Anson and the Queen, supra and R. v. Tucker, supra
and see Re Corbeil and The Queen (1986), 27 C.C.C. (3d) 245
(Ont. C.A.); R. v. Arcand, [2004] O.J. No. 5017 (Ont. C.A.)
(Q.L.); R. v. Johnson (1991), 3 O.K. (3d) 49 (Ont. C.A.).

JCT: 5000 epileptics tricked into dying over the past 3.5
years by the last court isn't exceptional circumstance
enough?

20. In particular, the extraordinary remedies of mandamus
and prohibition are not granted if some other remedy is
available. Assuming that the issues in the cases at bar have
a jurisdictional aspect to them, the appellants may raise
these issues at trial, and thereafter, if necessary on
appeal. There are no "very special" or "exceptional"
circumstances warranting the disruption of the criminal
trials in these cases.

JCT: There is no disruption except where the trial needs to
be rushed forward for pressing reasons.

D) Production Of Marihuana And Possession Of Marihuana For
The Purpose Of Trafficking Are Offences Known To Law

JCT: Notice he hasn't touched on whether Krieger struck down
Section 7 cultivation and Section 4 possession for medical
users Pierre Drouin and Real Martin. Only the straw man,
easy case, my S.5(2) possession (of a then legal substance)
for the purpose of trafficking.

21. The appeals are all premised on the argument that all
prohibitions against marijuana in the CDSA have been "struck
down" or "are of no force and effect". The appellants argue
that when the Ontario Court of Appeal in Parker declared to
be invalid the reference to marihuana in Schedule II for the
purposes of the offence of possession of marihuana in
section 4 of the CDSA, that Order effectively deleted
marihuana from Schedule II to the CDSA, thereby removing
marihuana from the list of controlled substances under the
CDSA. The appellants argue that as a result the offences of
trafficking in marihuana and production of marihuana had
been "repealed".

JCT: This is the S.5(2) is also gone with Parker.

22. The appellants argument, however, is grounded on a
fundamental misunderstanding of the effect of this court's
order in Parker(22).
(22) R. v. Parker (2000), 146 C.C.C.(3d) 193 (Ont.C.A.
In Parker, this court determined that the prohibition
against simple possession of marihuana in the CDSA was
overly broad, as the legislative scheme failed to provide an
exemption for medical use. The constitutional validity of
the offence of possession of marihuana for the purpose of
trafficking, in section 5(2) of the CDSA, and production of
marihuana, in section 7 of the CDSA, was not before this
court in Parker.(23)
(23) See R. v. Krieger, [2000] A.J. No. 1683 (Alta.Q.B.);
aff d [2002] A.J. No. 1644.(Alta. C.A.); leave to appeal to
the Supreme Court of Canada denied. In this case the court
upheld the constitutional validity of the offence of
possession of cannabis marihuana for the purpose of
trafficking. (The Alberta Court of Appeal ordered a new
trial on the trafficking charge, but only with respect to
the trial judge's charge to the jury regarding the defence
of necessity. The validity of the trafficking offence was
not overturned.

JCT: But the validity of the cultivation offence was and
it's the only thing Pierre Drouin is attacking. No defence
to the Krieger invalidation for Drouin's S.7 charge because
the Crown says the invalidation doesn't affect S.5(2)?

23. This court has already found that these types of
arguments are misconceived and explained that its
declaration of invalidity did not delete marihuana as a
controlled substance in Schedule II(24).
(24) See Turmel, supra

As this court has aptly noted, pursuant to s.52(l) of the
Constitution Act, the court only had jurisdiction to declare
the prohibition against marihuana unconstitutional to the
extent of its inconsistency with the Constitution. Since the
constitutional issue in Parker was restricted to possession
of marihuana for medical purposes, and not for the purposes
of trafficking, the declaration of invalidity was restricted
to the prohibition against marihuana only in relation to the
offence of simple possession under the CDSA. <All other
offence provisions in respect of marihuana, such as
production of marihuana, trafficking in marihuana,
possession of marihuana for the purpose of trafficking, and
importing of marihuana, remained in full force and effect.>

JCT: Back to focusing on my weaker S.5(2) implied
invalidation but ignoring Drouin's real Krieger
invalidation.

24. Since there has never been a declaration of invalidity
in respect of the offence of possession for the purpose of
trafficking or production of marihuana in Ontario,

JCT: And they're saying that the Krieger invalidation of S.7
by the Alberta Court of Appeal isn't as effective in Ontario
as the Parker invalidation of S.4 by the Ontario Court of
Appeal in Alberta was where the Crown dropped all remaining
charges.

these offences existed at the time the appellants were
alleged to have committed their crimes.25.

JCT: Only the existence of the S.5(2) prohibition against
possession for the purpose of trafficking, not Drouin's S.7
prohibition against cultivation killed by Krieger. The more
the Crown focuses on only only the weaker S.5(2) implied
invalidation and ignores the stronger real S.7 Krieger
invalidation, the more it stands out they have no answer.

(25) A useful summary of the positions of the appellants and
the response to these misplaced arguments is set out by
Justice Belanger in the Ontario Court of Justice, who,
recently, convicted the appellant Turmel (C44587 and C44588)
on March 10, 2006. See Affidavit of Julianne Kelloway. dated
March 15, 2006, Exhibit L.

JCT: But no actual arguments are offered herein.

E) Conclusion on Motion to Quash

25. The appeals should be quashed. Courts have been
traditionally loathe to give prerogative relief prior to the
end of a trial because it leads to unnecessary fragmentation
of the trial process and undue delay.

JCT: But not in these cases where motions were brought
before there were any trials to fragment!

Having regard to the procedural history of the cases before
the court, these prosecutions have developed into textbook
situations that underlie the policy reason for limiting
prerogative remedies. If these appeals are not quashed there
is every reason to believe that these cases will continue to
be mired in interlocutory appeal and other procedural
wrangling.

JCT: The Criminal Code of Canada makes the option available
and it's up to Parliament to close down that option, not up
to the courts.

F) Response to Appeals C44684, C44683, C44587, C44588

26. In the event that the appeals are not quashed, they
should be dismissed as being without merit. It is clear that
the proposed grounds of appeal are premised on the
remarkable proposition that at present there is no
prohibition against the possession, production and
possession of marihuana for the purposes of trafficking.

JCT: Remarkable doesn't make it untrue.

27. Prohibition and certiorari are discretionary
remedies.

JCT: No kidding. The court has the discretion to put an end
to the genocide of those who need this medicinal herb by
prohibition of this non-toxic never-fatal almost-panacea
for-sure-threat-to-the-pharmaceuticals herb.

In considering the appeals on their merits, the issue as to
whether any of the decisions appealed from ought to be
reversed, the court must take into account the discretionary
nature of the relief sought below by each of the appellants.
A review of the decisions by each of the judges in the
Superior Court dismissing the appellant's application for
prohibition or certiorari demonstrate that none of the
judges have committed misdirection or rendered a decision
'so wrong as to amount to an injustice".(24)
(24) R. v. Carosella(1997). 112 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (S.C.C.)
at p.309

JCT: A review of four decisions which all say "Dismissed"
and no other written reasons demonstrates something? Har har
har har. And if it's wrong, is "so wrong" enough? Wrong is
injustice. It doesn't have to be "so wrong" before being an
injustice.

G) Response to Appeal C45295 (Turmel)

28. The appellant, Turmel, advanced two core submissions
before the trial judge on December 15 2005. He submitted
that (i) the proceedings should be "suspended" because he
had filed notices of appeal before the Court of Appeal for
Ontario that would deal with MacLeod J.'s dismissal of his
prohibition and certiorari applications; and (ii) he was
charged with an offence not known to law because the statute
had been repealed by the Supreme Court of Canada.

29. After hearing submissions from both the appellant and
Crown counsel, the trial judge refused to suspend or adjourn
the trial awaiting the outcome of any appeal from MacLeod
J.'s order. The trial judge correctly concluded:
"Mr. Turmel, of course, if this matter proceeds, is
perfectly free to make his arguments before me in relation
to the invalidity of the legislation, and, of course, he
will be completely free to appeal any ruling which I make at
the conclusion of the case if the matter concludes
negatively to his interests.

JCT: Which is exactly the case so all the arguments raised
on the prohibition and certiorari appeals must be
adjudicated in the appeal of the conviction and denial of
the suggested S.601 motion to quash. So if the demands for
extraordinary remedy is denied because it's available upon
appeal from trial conviction, then I'm there too! Quite
useful having it linked with the prohibitions except 4 dying
epileptics a day for nothing is extraordinary reason enough
to go for the big quick solution.

"And I simply conclude by saying, as I mentioned, I think,
previously this morning, that there is a strong undercurrent
underlying our jurisprudence that cases ought to be tried on
their merits so that as complete a record as possible is
available to reviewing courts in an appellate position.(27)
(27) Transcript of Proceedings December 15 2005 at p.23.

30. After ruling that he had jurisdiction to hear the trial,
the trial judge invited the appellant to make submissions to
him as to the law in writing. The trial judge adjourned
proceedings to March 10 2005 for a ruling on appellant's
submission that he was charged with an offence not known to
law. However, he proceeded to hear evidence on December 2005
so as not to inconvenience witnesses.

31. The appellant consented to this procedure and
essentially admitted the Crown's case. The facts were that
the appellant wrote and faxed a letter to the Department of
Justice in Toronto on May 14 2003 that stated as follows:
"I will pick up my store of seven pounds of marijuana and
take it to Parliament Hill to openly smoke a joint as M.P.s
enter and dare the government to prosecute me under a now
dead law. Then I will be leaving a pound at the door of
Parliament for their inspection, leaving a second pound at
the Prime Minister's Office (it could help him quit
alcohol). Then I will go down to the Supreme Court of Canada
on Wellington Street to drop off a third pound, then across
the street to drop off a fourth pound at your Attorney
General's office, then I'll be going down Elgin Street to
the Ontario provincial courthouse and drop off a fifth
pound, then off down Elgin to the Ottawa Police station
where I will drop off my sixth pound - of course, if I get
off Parliament Hill."

32. The appellant was arrested on Parliament Hill and he was
holding a bag of what appeared to be marihuana. He had in
his possession 3.3 kilograms of marihuana in 7 bags.

33. The appellant called no evidence at trial and admitted
that "if the law is alive, then I'm in big trouble."

JCT: I never got the chance. I was waiting for the decision
on my pre-trial pre-plea S.601 motion to quash as unknown to
law.

The trial judge then adjourned the trial for judgment on
March 10 2005.

JCT: Judgment on the motion to quash, not judgment on a
trial I hadn't yet made a constitutional challenge against
nor entered any defence.

34. On March 10 2005, the trial judge released written
reasons.

JCT: Not only for the ruling on the pre-trial pre-plea
motion to quash but also on the conviction.

While it would have been preferable for the judge to not
simply adopt the written submissions of the Crown, (31)
See the recent decision of this court in 2878852 Canada Inc.
v. Jones Heward Investment Counsel Inc. and Marshall
Nicholishen, [2007] O.J. No. 78 (C.A.)

the trial judge dealt with this matter concluding:

"I am entirely satisfied that the grounds upon which the
application is based have been ruled upon by Courts whose
reasons both bind and persuade me.

JCT: Oh, the Krieger invalidation has been dealt with
somewhere before by higher courts? No they have not.

I am unable to craft a decision which is in any way more
eloquent or complete in its analysis than that which has
been advanced by counsel for the Crown. <I am not swayed by
the applicant's submissions and entreaties that I decline to
abide by decisions of hierarchically superior courts.> I
refuse to do so, both on principle and because I am in total
agreement with them."(32)
(32) Reasons for judgment dated March 10 2005.

JCT: He's in total agreement that the courts start accepting
that the courts a resurrected a statute that had been deemed
repealed pursuant to the Interpretation Act until they were
told to ignore the Interpretation Act and deem statutes that
have been declared of no force and effect only "absent" and
resurrectable. Judge Belanger agrees with what the Hitzig
court did. I wonder if he approves of the 5000 dead
epileptics caused by that decision too?

35. The Crown relies on the submissions found at paragraphs
21-24 above.

JCT: Para.21 said the Parker invalidation does not apply to
S.5(2) "purpose to traffick." Para.22 said the Parker
invalidation does not apply S.5(2) and S.7 cultivation and
that Krieger upheld S.5(2). Para.23 says Parker doesn't
apply to S.5(2), again. Para.24 says S.5(2) nor S.7 struck
down in Ontario.
He's going to argue that S.7 has only been struck down in
Alberta, and needs to be struck down in each and every
province one at a time. Pierre's the perfect Krieger case
for it though. He got his exemption! So, the Crown keeps
focusing on my weaker case while ducking Pierre Drouin's S.7
case. Only the existence of the S.5(2) prohibition against
possession for the purpose of trafficking, not Drouin's S.7
prohibition against cultivation killed by Krieger. The more
the Crown focuses on only only the weaker S.5(2) implied
invalidation and ignores the stronger real S.7 Krieger
invalidation, the more it stands out they have no answer.

The submissions mirror the Crown's submissions at trial and
were adopted by the trial judge. The appellant, having
admitted the Crown's case at trial, was properly convicted.

JCT: Not being given a chance to raise the ensuing
constitutional challenge after the pre-trial challenge had
been dismissed nor present a defence was proper?

As the appellant noted, if his argument that he was not
charged with an offence known to law failed, a conviction
was inevitable.

JCT: I never said "inevitable."

The trial judge considered the appellant's submissions on
the state of the law regarding the prohibition of marijuana
possession and did not err in finding the appellant guilty.
With respect, the trial judge was bound by this court's
decision in a previous ruling involving the same appellant
and the same case.

36. Nor, did the trial judge err in refusing to hear the
appellant's constitutional argument brought to the trial
judge's attention after he had been found guilty.

JCT: Brought to the judge's attention after the pre-plea
S.601 motion to quash had been ruled upon.

Indeed, given the history of the matter, he had every reason
to believe that such a challenge, without notice,

JCT: with no time given for notice after the motion to quash
was dismissed...

and brought at the last minute

JCT: right after the pre-plea motion to quash was dealt
with...

was frivolous, vexatious and designed to stall sentencing.

JCT: Raising a violation of my right to life by being denied
a useful medical herb for prevention of possible disease
rather than the proven violation of Terry's right to life by
being denied a useful herb for treatment of known disease is
not frivolous, vexatious nor designed to stall sentencing.
Cheap shots. Then again, it's the only shots the Crown have
got.

PART IV: ORDER REQUESTED

37. The Crown requests that the application to quash be
granted and that appeals C44684, C44683, C44587, C44588 be
quashed or dismissed.

38. The Crown requests that appeal C45295 be dismissed.


ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

DATED at the City of Toronto, this 5th day of Feb, 2007.
Steve Coroza
Counsel for the Applicant (Respondent on Appeal)
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA ON THE
MOTION TO QUASH THE APPEALS
Francois Lacasse/Steve Coroza
Counsel for Public Prosecution Service of Canada
Ontario Regional Office,
201 County Court Blvd. Suite 600 Brampton, Ontario L6W 4L2
Tel: (905) 454-2424 Fax: (905)454-2168

JCT: So all they can do is focus on my previous Turmel
appeal to keep repeating that S.5(2) and S.7 were not
deleted by Parker. And Krieger doesn't apply in Ontario
until we get our own Krieger precedent. If true, that a
Court of Appeal decision isn't binding on the the rest of
Canada's federal Crown Attorneys, then Drouin is the perfect
case to set a Krieger precedent for Ontario!

Notice there was no argument at all to the case that having
over 3Kg meant that a lower court judge did not have
jurisdiction over me without my electing so.

So it all boils down to whether thousands of dead epileptics
and more dying every day calls for extraordinary relief.
Since the Ontario Court of Appeal is responsible for the
genocide, it might be hard-pressed to take it seriously!



--
Abolitionist Slave Leader John C."The Banking Systems Engineer" Turmel
for UNILETS interest-free time-based currency in U.N. resolution C6
to Governments in the http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration.htm
http://www.cyberclass.net/turmel 519-753-0645 USENET: can.politics